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Abstract 
All current and conceivable near-term climate protection measures only cover a limited 
fraction of global emissions. For market-based instruments such as CO2 taxes or cap-and-
trade systems, a single value attached to CO2 (independent of the source that generates it), 
is insufficient to account for the complex economic interlinkages between specific emission-
generating activities and CO2 emissions throughout the world. First, static partial and general 
equilibrium models illustrate how different types of emissions are subject to specific general 
equilibrium translation factors and leakage effects, which define the optimal pattern of fuel-
specific, unilateral carbon taxes. The leakage, which implies that regional emission avoidance 
may partly be offset in other regions and time periods, depends on the type of resources 
involved and the characteristics of the markets in which they are traded. Second, a dynamic 
model accounting for fuel exhaustibility shows that the time dimension is crucial and that the 
relevant medium-term leakage may be much larger than the suggested rates from models 
that are typically (i) static or (ii) dynamic with a limited fuel depletion or that (iii) restrict 
their attention to a limited time horizon. Sensible leakage rates depend on the discount rate 
for future emissions and on uncertain future technological and political developments. The 
traditional leakage literature does not explicitly consider these factors, even though in their 
absence long-run leakage would typically approach 100 %. Numerical simulations of present-
discounted long-term effects indicate that in a business-as-usual scenario the optimal 
unilateral OECD climate tax rate on CO2 emissions from oil may be only half of the tax rate 
on emissions from coal. This is reverted if the CO2  intensive coal-to-liquids conversion 
processes become an important additional source of liquid fuels in the future. In this case 
negative leakage occurs and the optimal current climate tax on oil emissions may be up to 
two times the genuine regional willingness to pay for global emission reductions, even if the 
substitution of crude oil by synthetic liquids starts only in the future. 
Keywords 
Unilateral climate policy, fuel specific carbon tax, fossil fuel exhaustion/depletion, leakage 
over time, general equilibrium resource market, coal-to-liquids, liquefaction, OECD. 
JEL Classification 
Q58, Q54, Q41, H23, H21, Q56. 1 Introduction and Short Literature Overview
A climate policy aimed at an economically e￿cient reduction of carbon dioxide (CO 2)
emissions may take the form of a CO 2 tax or a cap-and-trade system. The level of the tax,
or correspondingly, the tightness of the allowances in the cap-and-trade system, expresses
a willingness to pay (WTP) for climate protection, that is, for global greenhouse gas
emission reductions. In a ￿rst-best world, where an optimal tax scheme can be imposed,
all global emissions would be subject to an identical per-unit emission tax. Alternatively,
in a second-best case, where a climate policy is implemented only in parts of the world (we
refer to this as the policy region), a uniform tax level on emissions may still be optimal
in the absence of relevant links between emissions in the policy region and those in the
rest of the world. In this case, regional emission reduction would translate one-for-one
to reductions in global emissions, for which agents are willing to pay. However, both the
￿rst- and this second-best scenario are unlikely to correspond to the reality of current or
near-future climate policies. First, all climate protection measures implemented thus far
cover only a fraction of global emissions, and there is no global agreement in sight for the
remainder of the decade. Second, major sources of fossil energy and anthropogenic CO 2,
notably oil, natural gas and to some extent coal, are traded on global markets rather than
only on regional markets (as are other goods whose production depends on the fuels).
This implies that consumption reductions in one region will directly impact the resource
availability and consumption in other regions, that is, the independence of emissions across
regions is violated for the most important sources of anthropogenic CO 2 emissions. The
global character of the fuel supply is a primary reason why a regional emission change
does not generally imply a global emission change of the same magnitude. This is the
well-known issue of carbon leakage (e.g., Felder and Rutherford, 1993, and Burniaux and
Oliveira-Martins, forthcoming).
An e￿cient market measure motivated by climate protection implies uniform marginal
emission costs for (indirect) global rather than regional emissions. As a regional pol-
icy can, however, only sanction regional emissions, an e￿cient second-best 1 policy must
weight these regional emissions by the degree of in￿uence they have on global emissions.
The various primary fuels used in today’s economy have strongly varying supply charac-
teristics. For example, brown coal is often only consumed regionally 2; coal reserves are
often considered as practically unlimited 3; oil and gas are globally traded and exploitable
in limited amounts at increasing costs; and locally or regionally consumed wood is, in
1The policy is considered second-best because it is regional instead of global.
2See, e.g., IEA (2011), Part IV: The various Tables ‘3. Coal and peat production by type’ and ‘8.
Coal trade by type of coal’ for the various surveyed regions.
3See, e.g., van der Ploeg and Withagen (2011) and Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins (forthcoming). The
strong characteristic di￿erence between oil and coal supply is also pointed out in Burniaux et al. (1992)
and Golombek et al. (1995).
3some circumstances, renewable. Thus, a regional change in the consumption of one of the
di￿erent fuels implies a speci￿c variation in the global consumption of that fuel as well as
other fuels. The optimal regional CO 2 price contains a proportionality factor that re￿ects
the extent to which regional emission changes translate into global emission changes, and
this price is, therefore, likely to vary substantially across fuels. This implies that it is
inappropriate for a regional market-oriented policy to weight (and thus, to price) all do-
mestic emissions uniformly. This paper addresses the fuel dependency of optimal regional
emission weighting.
Neglecting fuel-dependent prices, the traditional carbon leakage literature has largely
restricted attention to economic sector-speci￿c leakage and terms-of-trade factors that
imply sector-speci￿c carbon pricing and, eventually, sector-wide policy exemptions. Hoel
(1996) provided an extensive analysis of sector-speci￿c di￿erentiation of a unilateral CO 2
tax considering a single aggregated fuel. More recently, B￿hringer et al. (2010) introduced
a speci￿c technique to distinguish between the e￿ciency-related leakage motive and the
terms-of-trade reason for sector-di￿erentiation of a unilateral tax. In contrast to their
analytical model, their numerical analysis of US and EU policies distinguishes between
a number of di￿erent fuels. However, the considered tax was still wholly sector-speci￿c,
and fuel-speci￿c taxes were not considered in their paper. Similarly, Kirchg￿ssner et al.
(1998) examines the importance of sectoral exemptions on the economic and environmen-
tal impacts of a unilateral climate tax. Kirchg￿ssner (2001) discusses the reasons why
the optimal climate taxes may be sector-speci￿c if, according to political economics or
ordinary people’s preferences, the objective is to limit tax revenue rather than simply the
excess burden. Finally, Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins (forthcoming) extensively examine
the di￿erences between oil and coal in terms of supply elasticities and global market inte-
gration. While they identify the impact of these market characteristics on the leakage rate
of unilateral climate policy, their focus remains on a uniform carbon price, optimized not
with respect to the carbon leakage but simply for respecting a speci￿c regional emission
threshold.
While Golombek et al. (1995) have addressed the issue of the optimal regional fuel-speci￿c
tax structure, the present analysis extends their study in two important ways. First, their
focus remained on a static model, notably assuming an isoelastic, static supply of fossil
fuels. This is in contrast to one of the most distinguishable features of the supply of non-
renewable resources; that is, the fuels are exhaustible, with extraction costs that are, in the
medium-term, increasing in the amounts previously extracted. Here, the exhaustibility
of the fuels is explicitly considered, within the framework of a numerical dynamic model
of the fuel markets where suppliers strategically allocate the extraction of their fuels
over time, maximizing their present discounted net revenues subject to the (increasing)
extraction costs. As will be explained, this is crucial, as the concept of a static leakage
4rate is inherently incompatible with exhaustible emission sources. Second, their static
framework did not allow them to consider future developments in the fuel market. In
reality, the supply of solid, liquid and gaseous fossil fuels may dramatically change from
the currently observed pattern once the relative availability of speci￿c fuels signi￿cantly
changes due to advanced degrees of exhaustion. As an example, fuel transformation
processes, such as coal-to-liquids (liquefaction), may become widespread if the extraction
cost of oil increases further and coal remains abundant. Using a general equilibrium model
with a detailed representation of the supply of petroleum, and other energy products in
general, and a bottom-up implementation of coal-to-liquids processes, Chen et al. (2011)
estimate that liquefaction could account for one-third of the global liquid fuel supply
in 2050. Allowing for such a fuel transformation process when the fuel prices render it
economical, the model developed here is used to investigate the potential implications of
these processes for the optimal unilateral climate tax structure.
In addition to these central di￿erences to the study of Golombek et al. (1995), the present
analysis focuses on the economic concept of a general WTP for climate protection rather
than on a ￿xed (global) emission reduction, as assumed in the numerical application in
Golombek et al. (1995). The present study does, however, follow Golombek et al. (1995)
by focusing on the market for fuels. This seems a suitable approach, as, for example,
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2008) and B￿hringer et al. (2010) have shown that the trade
of non-energy goods is of minor importance for both leakage and terms-of-trade e￿ects
￿ these e￿ects are dominated by the international trade in fuels. 4 Similarly, Oliveira-
Martins (1995) and Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins (forthcoming) ￿nd that the leakage
e￿ects are primarily determined by the fossil fuel market, while trade characteristics of
consumer goods are less important.
The optimal regional, fuel-speci￿c carbon taxes determine the time-path of the consump-
tion of the various fossil fuels and the optimal time-path of the consumption of the fuels
is the central issue in van der Ploeg and Withagen (2011). Regarding the optimal carbon
tax pattern, their analysis, on the one hand, is limited to a focus on global policies, and
on the other hand they disregard the issue of the imperfect substitutability of the fuels as
inputs to speci￿c end-uses. In reality, society does not simply have a demand for a speci￿c
amount of ‘energy’, but it has a demand for di￿erent forms of energy carriers that are
to be used simultaneously. While, for example, liquid oil could be a valid substitute for
many applications that currently feed on solid fuels, the inverse is not true with current
technologies. In other words, the substitution would need speci￿c fuel preparation, such
as coal liquefaction or the switch from combustion engine-based mobility to vehicles pow-
ered by coal-derived grid electricity, with potentially large e￿ciency losses and overhead
costs. This has important repercussions on the second-best time-paths of fuel consump-
4The simulation results of Fischer and Fox (2011) suggest the same conclusion.
5tion achieved with the second-best policy instrument of unilateral, fuel-speci￿c carbon
taxes, as we will demonstrate herein. In this sense, certain portions of the present paper
can be considered as a synthesis of the static analysis about fuel-speci￿c unilateral carbon
pricing by Golombek et al. (1995) and an analysis of van der Ploeg and Withagen’s (2011)
study on global policies and the optimal time-path given exhaustibility but without the
issue of fuel-speci￿c ￿nal energy demand.
The (substantial) uncertainty about the long-term climate damage induced by carbon
emissions is here not directly considered. Golosov et al. (2011) develop an integrated dy-
namic stochastic general-equilibrium model to analyze optimal oil and coal taxes taking
into account uncertainty about climate costs that is resolved only in the future. Their
analysis is, however, also limited to an optimal global climate policy and thus not con-
cerned with leakage e￿ects. Similarly to van der Ploeg and Withagen (2011), they assume
oil and coal to be perfect substitutes, a view which is rejected here. Interestingly, Golosov
et al. (2011, p. 28) indicate the possibility of the use of lique￿ed coal in combustion engines
as a reason for their assumption of the perfect substitutability between the fuels. In our
view however, while liquefaction is allowed for here as well, the fact that this process may
become relevant in future exactly shows that oil and coal are only imperfect substitutes:
while in some applications the two fuels may be substitutable without large energy losses
and overhead costs (consider, e.g., the replacement of coal by oil in stationary power
stations), applications where coal can only be used after liquefaction imply substantial
overhead costs in terms of capital, labor and energy. 5 Finally, while Golosov et al. allow
for emission discounting, they use a fuel reserve model that is more stilized than that
used here ￿ they assume a ￿xed amount of oil available, worth around 30 years of current
consumption and extractable without costs, and coal is assumed to be of limitless supply
￿ and their model does not explicitly take into account the possibility of future climate
measures.
In today’s economic environment, the di￿erent uses of the various types of fuel suggest
that demand characteristics vary considerably across fuels. For example, cheap coal can
be used for electricity production and for some other immobile purposes, while notably
in the transport sector with explosion engines and for simple apartment heating systems,
consumers rely on liquid (or gaseous) fuels. Clearly, there exists a certain substitutability.
As an example, depending on the prices, one can heat an apartment with electricity (from
coal) instead of directly burning oil (or gas). That the fuels are non-perfect substitutes
seems logical as expressed by the large amounts of coal, oil and gas that are simultane-
ously consumed since many decades, despite (short- and longer-term) shifts in relative
prices over the past. While therewith the demands for the various fuels are complexly
intertwined, corresponding cross-price elasticities should generally allow an acceptable
5For example, energy losses in coal-to-liquids processes are very large. Overall energy e￿ciencies of
CTL processes are close to 50% (Bartis et al., 2008).
6approximation of the real demand structure. In the long run, however, it is important
to consider, other than this substitutability in the ￿nal demand, that signi￿cantly large
price di￿erences may render the transformation of fuels pro￿table. Due to the large coal
resources, this may lead to coal gasi￿cation or liquefaction (i.e., coal to oil transformation)
in the future and, eventually, gas to liquid processes.
The literature provides a considerable number of estimates of leakage rates for regional
greenhouse gas emission reductions. The suggested rates cover the full range of imaginable
values. As an example, B￿hringer et al. (2010) ￿nd leakage rates of 35￿40% for unilateral
action for the EU, and 15￿20% for the US. While a number of studies regarding the e￿ects
of the Kyoto agreement ￿nd leakage rates of approximately 20%, several other studies
suggest values of approximately 5% (see Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins, forthcoming, for
a short overview). Still others argue that leakage may exceed 100%. For example, Babiker
(2005) ￿nds leakage rates of up to 130% when taking into account industry dislocation
and economies of scale. Finally, Di Maria and van der Werf (2008) model how directed
technical change in the climate policy region provides e￿ciency enhancements that may
reduce emissions in the non-policy region even if the latter is not concerned about the
climate.
Independent of the large di￿erences between these values, a policy maker interested in
the medium- or longer-run e￿ects of unilateral action has a particular problem with the
proposed leakage rates from most of these studies. They neglect the time dimension or
treat it only inadequately, and therewith typically do not properly examine the under-
lying economic reasons why the leakage rates may be modest in reality. Instead, their
models ￿nd limited leakage rates for mostly technical reasons. To see this, note that the
models do typically neither apply any discount rate for future emissions, nor assume any
speci￿c future technological or political climate relevant changes to drastically limit the
scope for future emissions. If no technical or global political breakthrough in terms of
climate protection is foreseeable, any unilateral carbon tax may, however, only postpone
the time until which, for example, virtually all oil physically available and reasonably
extractable is consumed. In this case, domestic oil consumption reductions from a uni-
lateral climate policy are, in the medium-term, almost entirely compensated by emission
increases throughout the rest of the world (ROW). Even if parts of these ROW emission
increases occur somewhat later than the domestic emissions would have in the absence of
any regulation (it is not a priori clear whether the time shift is large or small), the overall
expected leakage is, in the absence of the discounting of future emissions, approximately
100%. Therefore, modest emission leakage rates seem logical only under the assumption
of future changes in the fuel market framework or if future emissions are discounted. Yet,
the reasons for which most studies have come up with limited carbon leakage rates are of
a di￿erent nature. For example, B￿hringer et al. (2010), Oliveira-Martins (forthcoming),
7Perroni and Rutherford (1993) and Babiker (2005) use static models. In such static mod-
els, the limited leakage rates typically stem from an ad hoc concept of a static fuel supply
function. Therewith they do not capture that fuel consumption savings in one period
may be consumed in later periods when otherwise the fuel reserves would already have
been depleted, i.e. the fuel simply lasts longer but will ultimately still be consumed. This
applies even to the study of Di Maria and van der Werf (2008) who assume endogenous
directed technological change but disregard the fuel-market channel of leakage and the
fossil fuels depletion.
Another large fraction of the leakage literature uses dynamic models but exhibits some
shortcomings in the treatment of the time dimension. For example, the dynamic models
in Bollen et al. (1999), Burniaux (2001), McKibbin et al. (1999), McKibbin and Wilcoxen
(2008) and OECD (2009) seem not to feature endogenously depleting fossil fuel reserves,
but instead make speci￿c assumptions on the exogenously given resource availability in
the di￿erent time-periods. Therewith their models do still not fully capture that lower fuel
consumption in early periods may simply imply that the saved resources may be consumed
later on. The reason for their modest leakage rates may thus also primarily be found in
the negligence of the dynamic, endogenous depletion of the resources. That the (fuel)
dynamics receives insu￿cient attention in a large fraction of the leakage studies is not only
astonishing because of its obvious importance due to the long term character of climate
change and the inherent exhaustibility of the fossil fuels, but also because with Felder
and Rutherford (1993) and Manne and Richels (1991), early authors had already used
dynamic models with at least partially endogenous fuel depletion mechanisms. Note that,
however, the approach in Felder and Rutherford (1993) and Manne and Richels (1991) was
rather a hybrid solution between an exogenous and an endogenous fuel depletion path,
e.g. with constant ratio depletion elements, not allowing forward looking resource owners
to choose a fully ￿exible fuel extraction path. Other examples of leakage studies that
feature endogenously depleting fuels are Manne and Richels (2000) using the MERGE
model, and Babiker and Jacoby (1999) using the EPPA model. Similarly to Felder and
Rutherford (1993) and Manne and Richels (1991), they use simulation periods that end
in 2050 or in 2100 and do neither discount emissions, nor assume that up to this point in
time a de￿nite technological or political solution to the carbon emission problem would
be found.6 Thus, it seems that even in these studies the modest leakage rates may be
rather technical results. These may be reversed if the model horizons would be longer,
allowing a major fraction of the domestically saved emissions to occur in the remainder of
the world.7 Thus, it appears that the most important reasons for which leakage may over
6Manne and Richels (2000) explain that any judgement on a Kyoto policy crucially depends on what
happens in the decades after the initial committment period centered around 2010, and study scenarios
until 2050. They do not model what happens beyond that period. As our dynamic model in section 7
shows, an important fraction of leakage from current policies may occur in the decades after 2050.
7Some studies assumed coal to be of in￿nitely elastic supply without depletion, and allowed for re-
8the long run be substantially below 100per cent, are typically not explicitly addressed in
literature. The proposed leakage rates are thus, per se, only of limited value for forward-
looking, concerned societies resp. their policy makers. This seems especially clear as the
primary reason for concern about climate change is that caused future global warming is
anticipated today ￿ if one exhibited too strong a time-discount rate with respect to future
temperature changes, one would hardly be concerned about the climate problem at all.
It seems obvious, then, that current policy evaluations must take into consideration the
e￿ect that the current policies will have on emissions also in the decades, and perhaps
centuries, to come. In the present study, the time dimension, especially in terms of
discounting for future emissions and the possibility of future market framework changes,
is explicitly taken into account, in a model that in addition features fully endogenously
depleting fossil fuel reserves.
After a discussion of the aim of unilateral climate action in in the following section,
section 3 introduces the general equilibrium translation factor (GTF), which expresses
how regional emission reductions due to speci￿c unilateral action translate into global
emission changes. Section 4 introduces a partial equilibrium model, showing that the
optimal carbon price in the policy region is (i) increasing in the supply elasticity of the
fuel and (ii) decreasing in the (absolute) demand elasticity of the fuel in the no-policy
region. The need for a fuel-speci￿c unilateral carbon price is con￿rmed in a general
equilibrium framework in section 5.
Section 6 brie￿y discusses the nature and energy economics of liquefaction processes in
which coal is transformed into synthetic liquids that provide a direct substitute for oil. In
the numerical part of section 7, insight regarding the importance of the discussed e￿ects
for the optimal carbon tax pattern is provided, derived from a dynamic numerical model of
the oil and coal market, with parameters roughly ￿tted to real-world characteristics. The
model assumes a carbon tax in the OECD and no signi￿cant climate protection measures
in the rest of the world. In the base speci￿cation, the limited substitutabilty of the fuels
and the steeply increasing extraction costs for oil imply large overall oil-leakage rates
(leakage over space and time) of approximately 50% and, thus, preferable regional taxes
on oil that may be as low as half the OECD’s WTP for global emission reductions. At the
same time, the signi￿cant abundance of coal implies an almost one-for-one reduction of
global emissions with respect to regional coal emission reductions and, thus, an optimal
climate tax on coal consumption that closely corresponds to the WTP for global emission
reductions.
This pattern is reversed in the case where a synthetic liquid fuel from coal liquefaction,
twice as carbon-intensive as genuine oil, replaces crude oil in the near-term future. In
placement of liquid fuels by coal. In the absence of time-discounting of emissions ￿ as well as of speci￿c
alternative technologies to replace the fossil fuels ￿, this approximation is valid only for the medium-term
future, as in the long run even coal reserves deplete.
9this case, each barrel of regionally saved crude oil implies that almost an entire barrel
less of synthetic fuel needs to be produced worldwide, leading to an optimal carbon price
on domestic oil consumption that is close to twice the domestic WTP for global emission
reductions, even during the periods prior to the introduction of the coal liquefaction
process. This means that in a scenario with future liquefaction, current unilateral oil
savings rates may be subject to a large negative overall leakage rate of close to -100%;
that is, the worldwide emission savings may be even larger than the domestic savings.
Interestingly, Felder and Rutherford (1993) have also suggested negative leakage rates
from a regional (not fuel-speci￿c) climate tax during the years when liquefaction starts to
play a role in the rest of the world. Besides the abovementioned issues with the somewhat
ad hoc representation of the fuel-extractions in their model, they seem to have restricted
their attention to instantaneous leakage rates for each period rather than considering the
e￿ect of current taxes on future emissions.
An extensive sensitivity analysis, allowing for a number of alternative scenarios and pa-
rameter speci￿cations, indicates that the ￿ndings are largely robust to a large number
of deviations from the main assumptions in the model. The ￿nding that reductions in
current oil consumption may be especially important if a reduced availability of oil im-
plies an earlier switch to synthetic carbon intense fuels is consistent with Burniaux et al.
(1992) who explained the importance of reducing fossil fuel subsidies to prevent the early
production of polluting synthetic fuels.
Section 8 provides a discussion of the results, and section 9 concludes. The issue of
non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions is consciously neglected throughout the discussion,
and the identi￿ed need to di￿erentiate CO 2 prices across fuels is independent of such
additional greenhouse gases. Additionally, reasons beyond direct climate protection, such
as distributional concerns and other issues related to governmental revenue requirements,
which have been suggested as eventual reasons to impose fuel-speci￿c taxes 8, are not
considered in this study.
2 E￿cient Climate Tax
A tax motivated by climate protection is e￿cient only if it charges every action at a
￿xed rate per unit of induced global greenhouse gas emission equivalents. Depending
on discount factors and the evolution of climate damages related to marginal emissions,
the corresponding tax rate may vary over time. Ignoring other emissions and the time-
dimension, in a static model concerning only CO 2 emissions, the e￿ciency criterion implies
a constant Pigou tax on global CO 2 emissions. Even if the politically agreed-upon WTP
8See, e.g., Poterba (1991), pp. 21￿23, where these issues are mentioned.
10for emissions abatement is lower than the estimated global bene￿ts, basic economic princi-
ples explain that a tax may optimally be uniform over all global CO 2 emissions. Generally,
a uniform tax of a level equal to the WTP for marginal emission reductions induces all
actors to implement every possible abatement measure that achieves CO 2 savings at a
per-unit cost lower than the tax level. Measures with higher per-unit abatement costs
will not be undertaken. Thus, the resulting amount of emission reductions could not be
achieved in any other way with lower total costs; the abatement achieved with such a tax
is e￿cient. This reason supports the widespread belief that, from an economic point of
view, CO2 taxes ought to be the same for emissions independent from the exact process
through which they were created.
For our discussion, it may often be preferable to refer to emission generating processes
rather than emissions, even though when global emissions are considered this is only
a matter of de￿nition: we may tax processes that create emissions or the therewith
generated emissions.
Considering emission generating processes, the e￿ciency requirement for an emission-
pricing scheme suggests that every process should be charged uniformly at the rate of
the politically agreed upon WTP per unit of global emissions it induces. This idea is
emphasized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 An e￿cient CO2 tax can be implemented by charging every emission-
generating process at a ￿xed amount  per unit of global CO2 emissions it induces, where
 is the marginal willingness to pay for emission reductions.
While Proposition 1 addresses emission taxation, it can directly be applied to cap-and-
trade mechanisms as well. If functioning well, such mechanisms largely correspond to
CO2 taxes with the level of the equivalent tax being the equilibrium certi￿cate-price in
the cap-and-trade system. In the following, we discuss the implication of Proposition 1
on optimal regional climate policy.
3 Regional Policy and General Equilibrium Translation
Factor GTF
Currently, and probably for the near future, climate policies are not only less stringent
than what economic analysis of presumed climate damage projections suggests, but en-
compass also a limited fraction of the world respectively of its CO 2 emissions. Thus,
emission taxes may not tax all global emissions but only those originating from within
the region of the climate coalition subject to the particular climate policy. Because the
11economies of the climate coalition and of the rest of the world are strongly interlinked,
emission processes in one region are likely to be relevant to emission processes in the
other. As an example, if fossil fuels consumption ￿ the source of 75% of anthropogenic
CO2 emissions ￿ is increased in one region, this drives up worldwide fuel prices and likely
lowers consumption in the other region. Any regional process with globally traded net
inputs or outputs is likely to substantially in￿uence emissions in the other region. Due
to these linkages, a process that creates a speci￿c amount of emissions in one region is
likely to imply a substantially di￿erent overall change in global emissions. Let the ratio
between the induced global emissions and the direct regional emissions of a process be





where el indicates the locally generated emissions of the process and eg the implied global
emission changes. For the combustion of fossil fuels, the GTF is likely to be substantially
lower than 1 but larger than 0 due to the mentioned mechanism relating to the worldwide
equilibrium price for globally traded fuels.
As stated in Proposition 1, e￿cient taxation of di￿erent processes requires charging them
at a ￿xed amount per unit of global emissions they induce. This relationship holds inde-
pendently of whether the policy in question is regional or global. If regional emissions are
taxed, the optimal tax on emissions is thus proportional to the GTF, as is emphasized in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The optimal regional tax  on emissions originating from a speci￿c process
equals the willingness to pay for the reduction of global emissions, 0, augmented by the
GTF,
 = 0  GTF;
with GTF de￿ned according to Eq. 1.
As the GTF can depend on various (inter-regionally traded) inputs and outputs of the
emission-creating process, it is likely to substantially di￿er for emissions with di￿erent
origins. This implies that a uniform tax across emissions from di￿erent processes, such
as combustions of di￿erent types of fossil fuels, is ine￿cient. Instead, for example, the
optimal taxes on emissions created by the combustion of globally traded oil should di￿er
from those created by more regionally consumed low-yield coal. 9 See e.g. Burniaux and
9The World Coal Institute (2005) explains that only about 18% of globally produced coal is inter-
nationally traded; the remainder is consumed domestically by its respective producers. According to
their information, high transportation costs, which can amount to 70% of consumer prices, imply that
there e￿ectively exist two regional markets, the Atlantic and the Paci￿c markets. As an example, only
12Oliveira-Martins (forthcoming) for an extensive discussion on the di￿erences in the market
characteristics between oil and coal and how they impact the leakage e￿ects.
While Proposition 2 focuses on a climate tax, it also extends to cap-and-trade mechanisms.
For such a mechanism to potentially be e￿cient, the various emissions must be weighted
proportionally to the GTF, i.e., an emitter must hold an amount of emission allowances
proportional to the local emissions created, augmented by the GTFs of the corresponding
processes.
The GTF is relevant for the leakage discussion to which production sector-speci￿c emission
prices resp. abatement targets or even policy exemptions are linked. A key point in this
analysis is that the GTF implies not only that sector-speci￿c emission prices may have to
be considered but also that the carbon price should be speci￿cally di￿erentiated between
the various fuels from which the emissions are generated. This point has largely been
neglected not only in practical policy implementations and related discussions but also in
the theoretical literature on climate policy. The next section proposes a stylized partial
equilibrium framework in which the GTF can be derived from basic market characteristics.
In the modern globalized economy, regional consumption of virtually any intermediate or
￿nal good, even those that do not directly relate to large amounts of CO 2 emissions, may
have some impact on CO2 emissions globally. In this sense, an optimal regional climate
tax may not only tax processes that generate emissions in the climate coalition region
but also impose positive or negative taxes on other processes. 10 For the remainder of our
analysis, we neglect this possibility, as several studies have found that the most signi￿cant
current impact of speci￿c regional climate policy choices on emissions in the remainder
of the world occurs through general equilibrium channel directly related to fossil fuel
market equilibria rather than through non-energy goods (B￿hringer et al., 2010; Oliveira-
Martins, 1995; Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins, forthcoming). We thus focus entirely on
fuel-speci￿c GTF, i.e., on fuel-speci￿c CO2 prices.
high-value coking coal is freighted globally from Australia, while less valuable coals are traded more
regionally.
10As a hypothetical stylized example, consider a good x which not only can be directly consumed
without creating emissions but also ￿gures as an essential input for some sorts of energy-related processes
y in which large amounts of emissions are generated. Under some circumstances, the climate coalition
may, in theory, impose a negative tax on the consumption of x as part of its climate protection policy,
which one might like to refer to as an ‘indirect global CO 2 tax’. Any additional amount of x consumed in
the climate coalition region, which, due to other emission taxes on process y in that region may correspond
to increased direct consumption of x rather than increased use of process y in that region, may reduce
the supply of x in the remainder of the world and therefore contribute to curbing global emissions by
reducing the use of the y-process in the remainder of the world.
134 GTF in a Linear Static Two-Region Partial Equilib-
rium Model
Let us focus on a partial equilibrium process with two regions indexed by r = ft;ng:
region t (the taxing region) imposes a tax, and the remainder of the world, region n (the
no-tax region) does not impose any comparable measure. The considered emissions are
created through the combustion of a globally traded fossil fuel, where p is the market
price of the fuel, fr is the consumption in region r, and s is the supply of fuels provided
by global producers. The regions have independent linear fuel demands, fr(p) = ar  brp.
The supply is given by the simple function s(p) = s0 + cp. The parameters ar, br and c
are nonnegative.
Consider ￿rst the case where region t does not impose any tax. In equilibrium a price p
for which supply meets global demand obtains, ft(p)+fn(p)
! = s(p), implying the price
p =
at+an s0
c+bt+bn and global supply s = s0 +cp = s0 +c
at+an s0
c+bt+bn for the taxless benchmark.
Equilibrium consumption in region t is f
t = ft(p) = at  
at+an s0
c+bt+bn bt.
If region t imposes a tax of rate  on its consumption of the fuel, this tax is added on
the price of the fuel on the global market, p, so that its demand becomes ft(p + ) =
at   (p + )bt, and the equilibrium price and supply are
p
 =
at + an   bt   s0
c + bt + bn
(2)
and s
 = s0 + c
at + an   bt   s0
c + bt + bn
:




 + ) = at  

at + an   bt   s0




The tax reduces global equilibrium consumption s by cbt
c+bt+bn. The consumption reduction
in region t is (  bt
c+bt+bn +)bt = bt( c+bn
c+bt+bn). Thus, the ratio between global reduction and
reduction in region t is c
c+bn. This ratio, which indicates by how much global emissions





i.e., the global reduction will in this framework always be lower than the regional reduc-
tion. The global reduction will be smaller if the demand elasticity of the other region is
large (bn large) and if the supply decreases slowly when the sales price drops ( c is low).
Given the speci￿ed supply function in a competitive market, the same market equilib-
14rium is found if instead of imposing a tax, region t reduces its consumption using a
di￿erent market mechanism such as an internal cap-and-trade scheme: both regions buy
the resource at the same pre-tax price, implying that the market clears for the price p
from Eq. 2 with a  that corresponds to the level of reduction in region t imposed by
the cap-and-trade policy. Thus, the cap-and-trade scheme would be subject to the same
GTF.
The implications of Eq. 3 may best be illustrated by means of four extreme cases:
 Let the global supply of the fuel be perfectly inelastic, which holds for c = 0, and let
the demand in region n be decreasing in the fuel price, which implies 0 < bn < 1.
This situation is depicted in Fig. 1.



















Figure 1: Partial equilibrium: perfectly inelastic global fuel supply
Aggregate fuel consumption is not changed by the tax . Demand in the tax-region, ft(p), in
the no-tax region, fn(p), and aggregated worldwide demand, f(p;), for the fuel are given in
green, red, and black respectively. Blue indicates the supply s(p) of the fuel. The dotted curves
indicate demand if the tax-region imposes the tax .
zero despite the externality; the global emissions are constant independent of the
climate coalition’s emission reduction e￿ort. Given that region n does not adhere to
any climate protection treaty, for e￿ciency reasons, region t’s welfare is maximized
if it imposes no tax on its emissions from that fuel, despite its WTP for global
emission reductions. This corresponds to the expression of the GTF in Eq. 3 as
follows: GTF = c
c+bn = 0
0+bn = 0.
 Let the global supply of the fuel be in￿nitely elastic, implying c = 1, and the
demand in region n be decreasing in the fuel price, i.e., 0 < bn < 1, as depicted in
Fig. 2.
In this situation, the tax on the fuel-based emissions in region t should correspond





















Figure 2: Partial equilibrium: in￿nitely elastic global fuel supply
Aggregate fuel consumption changes one-per-one with domestic fuel savings. See Fig. 1 for the
￿gure key.
0. Given that the price of the resource is ￿xed independent of global demand,
consumption in region t in￿uences neither the demand for this fuel in region n nor
the related emissions in region n. This also matches the GTF according to Eq. 3 as
follows: GTF = c
c+bn = 1
1+bn = 1.
 Let the global supply of the fuel increase in the price, implying 0 < c < 1, and the
demand in region n be perfectly inelastic, i.e., bn = 0, as depicted in Fig. 3.




















Figure 3: Partial equilibrium: perfectly inelastic demand in the no-policy re-
gion
Aggregate fuel consumption changes one-per-one with domestic fuel savings. See Fig. 1 for the
￿gure key.
the general willingness in the region to pay for global emission abatements,  = 0.
Given that the demand for the fuel in region n is ￿xed independent of its price,
16the consumption in region t in￿uences neither the demand for this fuel in region
n nor the related emissions in that region. Emission changes in region t translate
one-for-one to global emission changes. This corresponds to the expression of the
GTF in Eq. 3 as follows: GTF = c
c+bn = c
c+0 = 1.
This market setting can be of some practical relevance, notably, if the considered
fuel has a low energy density that prevents global trade, such as could be the case for
some peat stocks. In this case, the demand for peat from region t in the remainder
of the world is likely to be zero due to trade frictions such as transport costs.
Replacement of domestic consumption of peat in the climate-protecting region with
a climate-neutral fuel (such as sustainably grown local wood could eventually be)
would thus be fully translated into global emission reductions, i.e., GTF = 1.
 Let the global supply of the fuel be increasing in the price, as is the case for 0 <
c < 1, and the demand in region n be in￿nitely elastic, i.e., bn = 1, as depicted
in Fig. 4.



















Figure 4: Partial equilibrium: in￿nitely elastic demand in the no-policy region
Aggregate fuel consumption is not changed by the tax . See Fig. 1 for the ￿gure key.
despite the externality. A tax on region t’s emissions will only change the proportion
of the global consumption of the fuel between the two regions but leave the total
consumption unchanged and, therefore, not in￿uence global emissions. Similar to
the case of a constant supply of the fuel, imposing no tax yields the highest welfare
level for region t despite its WTP for global emission reductions. As before, this




In reality, characteristics of emission-related markets may more likely correspond to more
moderate scenarios than these four extreme cases, and the GTF will accordingly take on
17a value strictly between 0 and 1. The complexity of economic interregional relations may,
however, not allow ruling out a priori the possibility of speci￿c more-than-compensating
or amplifying feedbacks, i.e., cases where the GTF is below 0 or greater than 1 may, in
theory, be possible.
5 Fuel Dependence in a General Equilibrium Frame-
work
In this section, we examine the optimal regional emission tax in a general equilibrium
model.11 We again assume a world split into two regions r, the taxing region t and the
non-tax region n, i.e. we use the same indexation as in the partial equilibrium analysis
above, r = ft;ng, where the taxing region t imposes climate taxes. There are two types
of energies e, indexed with i = f1;2g. The regions have a level of ￿nal good consumption,
cr, and regional energy consumption, ei
r.





labor dedicated for this production and the two energies are not perfect substitutes. The
regional energy production Ei
r is given by Ei
r = gi(li
r), where gi is an increasing function
of the labor li
r used for the production of the energy of type i. The regional total labor
endowment is normalized to 1 in both regions, ly
r + l1
r + l2
r = 1. Both the ￿nal good
and the energies are tradable between the regions; only labor is immobile. The regional
consumption of the ￿nal good is cr, and the regional consumption of the energies is ei
r.





for both energies. The energy clearances can also be written as ei = Ei when de￿ning
ei  ei
t+ei
n and Ei  Ei
t+Ei
n. In order for the optimal regional tax structure to be analyzed
e￿ciently, we consider a speci￿c global emission constraint that must be respected. We
thus consider tax structures, which respect the global emission threshold E. When the
energies are quanti￿ed in emission equivalent units, a speci￿c global emission constraint
to a level E can be written as e1 + e2  E.
The taxing region imposes a tax of rates i on energies. The ￿nal good has a price py. The
energies are traded globally for prices pei, and the regional prices are pr
ei. In the no-tax
region, which abstains from taxation, the two prices are the same, i.e., pn
ei = pei. In the
taxing region, the taxes are added to the prices, i.e., pt
ei = pei + i.
In a decentralized equilibrium with competitive production the following ￿rst-order con-
11The analysis in this section is an adaptation of the analysis in B￿hringer et al. (2010), where a slightly
di￿erent model was used to focus on sector-speci￿c taxation but the question of speci￿cally di￿erentiating














































Balanced regional budgets mean











Optimal regional taxes for the taxing region are those that maximize the domestic ￿nal
consumption ct with respect to i such that e1+e2  E. Di￿erentiating with respect to i
















The optimal regional taxes can readily be analyzed using derivations based upon the total
di￿erentials of the budget constraint presented in Eq. 5 and the e￿ciency conditions of








































































! = 0 8
if1;2g
Normalizing the price of the ￿nal consumption good, py  1 in order to consider real


































! = 0 8
if1;2g
(8)
In the absence of leakage and terms-of-trade e￿ects, Eq. 8 would hold for uniform taxation
19of emissions across all sources, j =  8
jf1;2g




di , and energy-trade
balances are typically non-zero and vary across the types of energy used, Eq. 8 requires
heterogeneous emission taxation, i.e., fuel-dependent emission prices. There is no reason
why the homogenous taxes j =  8
jf1;2g
could satisfy Eq. 8 in general for di￿erent fuel
resources, for example, which all have speci￿c extraction cost paths and di￿erent regional
demand curves.
We have shown that for a single production sector, producing a single product, yt, with
two di￿erent fuels as inputs, the optimal policy would not charge a unitary tax on the
producing entity’s emissions but would apply a di￿erent tax rate for each fuel the sector
consumes.
6 Liquefaction
Several processes exist through which coal can be transformed into synthetic liquid fuel,
which can be conditioned for replacing oil and its derivatives in all major applications.
South Africa produces 30% of the liquid fuel that it consumes through such coal lique-
faction processes (Sasol Synfuels International, 2005). While this currently makes South
Africa the largest coal liquefactor, China has plans for a number of very large coal lique-
faction plants, and proposals for plants exist in other countries as well.
Large amounts of coal can, in many places, be extracted cheaply for centuries. The
International Energy Agency (IEA) suggests there are approximately 1000 billion tons
(Gt hereafter) of proven recoverable reserves and approximatively 14 times that amount
in additional estimated resources (IEA, 2011). Meanwhile, the era of cheap crude oil
may end soon, given the current trend in annual consumption and the limited reserves.
In their World Energy Outlook, the IEA (2010) estimates 1350 billion barrels (Gbbl
hereafter) of proven conventional reserves and only 1250Gbbl of estimated additional
recoverable resources (of which 900Gbbl are yet to be found). Accounting for current
worldwide consumption rates12, this implies reserve-to-production ratios of 46 years for
oil and 210 years for coal. With respect to estimated recoverable resources, the ratios
become 81 years for oil and 3060 years for coal. 13 Coal-to-liquids processes may become
the predominant, or at least a very signi￿cant, source for liquid fuels relatively soon in
the current century.
As the total economic and environmental costs of the production of synthetic oil remain
a matter of dispute, it is unclear whether the fuel market will experience a massive de-
1231Gbbl of oil in 2009 and 4.7Gt of coal in 2008, according to IEA (2010).
13Some 2000￿3000 Gbbl of unconventional liquid fuels, exploitable only with considerably larger costs
and assessed with larger uncertainty, could add another 80 years worth of current oil consumption ac-
cording to the IEA (2005, 2008, 2010).
20ployment of coal-to-liquids production or, speci￿cally, at what time that transition will
occur. What is certain is that an important fraction of the liquefaction costs consist of
the price for the approximately 1 ton of coal that is needed per 2 barrel (bbl) of produced
synthetic oil (DOE/NETL, 2006 and Bartis et al., 2008). 14
The main issue with the liquefaction processes may be their high emission intensity.
DOE/NETL (2009) and EPA (2007) estimate that the ‘mine-to-wheel’ emissions from
the resulting synthetic fuel may be more than twice as large as that of standard oil: half a
ton of coal contains roughly 1 ton of CO 2, while a bbl of regular oil contains approximately
0.43 tons of CO2.15 Unless stringent global climate coalitions form in the near future, this
high emission intensity may not prevent many places in the world from using liquefaction
processes to produce oil that they can consume or sell at a high price on the future fuel
markets.
The prospect of future massive deployment of liquefaction processes has important impli-
cations for optimal unilateral climate policy already today. While current oil may contain
a speci￿c amount of direct (i.e., in the ￿nal consumption) ￿ or, not too much higher,
well-to-wheel ￿ emissions, the relevant factor for the optimal regional climate tax on oil
emissions depends on the longer-run e￿ect that the current oil consumption has on the
global emission path. Liquefaction represents, in a certain sense, an upper bound on the
price for which oil may, in the future, be sold on the market. Any oil that is more expen-
sive to extract than the production of synthetic oil may not be exploited. Therewith, the
total amount of extracted crude oil becomes, in the medium-run, relatively inelastic with
respect to the demand for liquid fuels. In this case, any additional barrel of oil consumed
today may imply almost an entire additional barrel of coal liquefaction taking place in the
medium-term future. With a limited discounting of climate damages that occur during
the time when liquefaction begins to replace a major part of the liquid fuels consumed,
this implies that the optimal regional climate tax on oil may be much higher than our
genuine WTP for climate protection. This issue is not trivial to deal with in a sensible
analytical model that allows for pro￿t-maximizing oil and coal owners. Therefore, it is
examined with a numerical model in the next section.
Coal liquefaction may not be the only relevant fuel-transformation process. Depending on
the relative availabilities and demands for coal, oil and gas, coal-to-gas and gas-to-liquids
processes may, in reality, ￿nd rapid expansion at some future time as well.
14In reality, the conversion factor depends on the type of coal used. While a rule-of-thumb estimate
for the coal-to-liquids yield from bituminous coal is 2 (barrels of oil per ton of coal), it is slighly lower
for subbituminous coal, about 1.8 (Bartis et al., 2008).
15Values suggested by Hoel (2010).
217 Numerical Analysis in a Dynamic Framework
The analysis of the models in sections 4 and 5 focuses on a static fuel supply. This is
a limited view notably because fossil fuels are of ￿nite supply, and extraction costs are
expected to increase in the coming decades primarily for oil and gas. This increase is
also expected in the longer run for coal because, although very large amounts exist, parts
may be exploitable for considerably higher costs than today’s coal. Accounting for the
exhaustibility of the fuels in an analytical model is complicated if the pro￿t maximization
of the fuel owners, as well as the fuel demand structure with non-zero (cross-)price elas-
ticities, is taken into account. Moreover, in a variant of the model we also account for the
possibility of synthetic oil to (partly) substitute crude oil as soon as the relative prices of
the fuels allow liquefaction to be economic. To investigate the possible magnitudes of the
optimal fuel-speci￿c regional taxes (and, correspondingly, the fuel-speci￿c leakage rates),
a numerical model is developed in this section.
7.1 The Model
The model contains two fuel consuming regions, the OECD and the rest of the world
(ROW or non-OECD), indexed by r = fo;ng. The OECD is assumed to impose a
carbon tax, while the remainder of the world abstains from comparable climate protection
measures. The two fuels considered are oil and coal, indexed by i = f1;2g. Because gas
has many features similar to oil, e.g. in terms of the exhaustibility and complementarity to
coal, one may interpret ‘oil’ as representative of the ensemble of oil and gas, an approach
suggested by van der Ploeg and Withagen (2011). The fuels are traded internationally at
prices p = [p1;p2].
Regional fuel consumption is denoted by xr = [xr;1;xr;2]. Following Golombek et al.
(1995), instantaneous regional welfare Wr is de￿ned with three linearly separable terms:
(i) utility from regional fossil fuel consumption ur(xr), (ii) the total regional costs for the
fuel provision cr(xr) and (iii) the regionally perceived environmental costs Dr(E), where
E denotes the global carbon emissions 16:
Wr = ur(xr)   cr(xr)   Dr (E): (9)
Each of the variables in Eq. 9 exists at each point in time t 2 [0::T], and the total regional







16See Golombek et al. (1995) for the derivation of this structure from a regional economic setting where
fossil fuels are used also as an intermediate input for ￿nal goods production.
22where  < 1 is the welfare time discount factor. Denoting cons as the discount rate, we
can express the discount factor as  = 1   cons.
Assuming the representative consumer in region r maximizes his welfare when he has to




! = pi 8
i
;
if the emissions are not taxed, and
@ur(xr)
@xr;i
! = pi + i"i 8
i
;
if emissions are taxed in region r, where i is the tax rate on emissions from domestic
consumption of fuel i and "i is the emission intensity of fuel i.
Suppliers are assumed to sell their fuels on the international market under perfect com-
petition. The exhaustibility of the fuels is modeled with an extraction cost curve that
indicates the marginal cost of extraction after a speci￿c cumulative amount of the fuel has
been extracted. This depletion concept is the logical consequence of the Her￿ndahl rule
(Her￿ndahl, 1967), which states that (given positive real-interest rates) pro￿t-maximizing
resource owners extract the fuels ordered in a sequence according to extraction costs: the
resources with the lowest extraction costs are extracted ￿rst, and the ones with the highest
extraction costs are extracted last. 17 Given this standard rule, and assuming the resource
owners discount their net revenues with the revenue discount rate res > 0, a current-value
Hamiltonian for the pro￿t maximization problem for the owners of one speci￿c fuel reads
as follows:
H = rt  (pt(rt)   e(At))   trt (10)
s.t.





where rt is the amount of the fuel extracted at time t, At is the cumulative amount of the
fuel extracted from the initial period up to time t, normalized to 0 for t = 0, e(A) is the
marginal extraction cost after the extraction of the A units of fuel that could be extracted
at the lowest costs, and pt(r) is the inverse demand for the considered fuel at time t: the
price pt results on the international fuel market if r units of the fuel are supplied (with
non-zero cross-price elasticities of fuel demand, pt may depend also on the amount of the
other fuel supplied at time t).
17While in a simple theoretical framework this rule should hold not only in a monopolistic but also
in a competitive framework, e.g. Beermann et al. (2011) give reasons why this rule is often only an
approximation to reality.
23The Hamiltonian in Eq. 10 yields the follwing two FOCs:
@H
@rt
= 0 : pt(rt)
! = e(At) + t (11)




! = tres   _ et;
where we de￿ne et  e(At),18 and t is, at time t, the shadow value for a marginal unit
of resource stock after the cumulative extraction of At previous units. As the ￿rst FOC
(Eq. 11) shows, the resource shadow value is the di￿erence between the price that the
resources achieve on the market and the extraction costs, that is, the per-unit resource
rent received by the resource-owner for sales at time t.
7.2 Numerical Illustration
Following Golombek et al. (1995) we assume quadratic fuel-consumption-derived utilities
ur. These are calibrated using the current regional consumption of oil and coal at current
prices in the OECD and the non-OECD region (see Appendix B) and the desired direct-
and cross-price elasticities of the demand. Again closely following Golombek et al. (1995),
the direct price demand elasticities are set to -0.9 for both fuels in both regions, and the
cross-price elasticities are 0.2, on average, in the standard scenario. 19
The curve of the extraction cost for oil as a function of cumulative extractions is a third-
order polynomial ￿tted to the oil cost curve estimated by the IEA (2005). The third-order
polynomial form allows a good ￿t to the IEA-curve. As detailed estimates for the costs
of exploiting substantial parts of the tremendous amount of existing coal resources are
unavailable, a modest exponential increase of coal provision costs is assumed, accounting
for the estimated amount of existing coal resources. The parameter cd is the amount of
coal extractions after which the coal extraction costs are assumed to double.
The OECD is assumed to present-discount its future instantaneous utilities at a pure-time
preference rate of cons = 5h,20 that is,  = 99:5%, and the less patient resource owners
18Note that as rt = @At








19Golombek et al. (1995) used -0.9 for the direct price elasticity for the fuel consumptions in the OECD
and -0.75 for the ROW, and they also used lower cross-price elasticities, with an average of 0.1. Here, the
(in absolute terms) larger demand elasticity in the Non-OECD region represents the interpretation that
as economies of the developing countries progress over time, their fuel demand structure may approach
that of the developed countries. The larger cross-price elasticities represent the interpretation that in
the longer-run, substantial relative price shifts of the fuels may lead to non-negligible fuel substitution.
The cross price elasticities for oil to coal are 0.05 in both regions and the coal to oil elasticities that then
follow are 0.46 and 0.21 for the OECD and the ROW.
20In their very in￿uential works, Nordhaus (2008) suggests a discount factor for the emisisons of 1.5%
and Stern (2007) suggests 1h. The present choice is a compromise between these values. Any extended
discussion of the reasons for higher and lower values for the controversial and important discount factor
is beyond the aim of the present study whose purpose is explorative rather than to provide precise
quantitative results.
24are assumed to have a discount rate of res = 3%. The emission intensity is 0.43tCO 2/bbl
for genuine oil and 2tCO2 per ton for coal.
Liquefaction is assumed to require 1 ton of coal per 2 barrels of oil produced (DOE/NETL,
2006). In addition to the input costs for this coal, the process is assumed to be subject to
a constant additional ￿xed cost for each barrel of synthetic fuel produced, cl, which takes
on a value of 15$/bbl (of produced synthetic oil-substitute) in the standard scenarios.
In the simulations that allow for liquefaction, the overall costs of the process represent
an upper bound for the oil sales price such that any demand that cannot be met by the
standard oil supply for that price will be provided as synthetic fuel from coal-liquefaction.
To cover the period for which the considered processes imply an interesting dynamics, the
simulation period stretches over 200 years. Until then, the major fraction of oil that is
extractable for reasonable costs is consumed (unless coal liquefaction is cheap enough to
replace genuine oil early). In addition, due to the exponential discounting, what happens
after the 200 years has only a limited weight in the present-discounted sum of all future
utilities.21
7.3 Results
Model Dynamics without Tax. Fig. 5 presents the model dynamics in a business-as-
usual scenario, that is, without any climate tax and when liquefaction does not become
an option in the future. As a standard, the coal extraction costs are assumed to increase
slowly, with a doubling of the costs only after the extraction of a large fraction of the
estimated coal resources, cd=10000Gt. This may, on ￿rst sight, seem optimistic in
terms of the resource availability, but given that the large reserves of coal are only slowly
depleted in any case, it does not seem unrealistic that technological progress may almost
compensate for the more complicated access to the reserves. 22 Fig. 6 shows the results
of the same simulation with the coal extraction costs doubling much more rapidly, after
every extracted 1000Gt, which mainly changes the price increase of the coal but has only
a limited e￿ect on the fuel consumption paths, somewhat reducing coal consumption in
the later periods.
Figs. 5 and 6 con￿rm the expectations that oil is depleted relatively quickly over time,
and its price on the market rises rapidly, such that parts of the oil are replaced by coal in
the longer run. This then leads to an increase in coal consumption over time during the
initial periods before the increasing coal extraction costs eventually lead to the decline of
the coal consumption rate as well (as observed after some 140 years in Fig. 6).
21For the resource owners, with a discount rate of 3%p.a., it is virtually negligible, with a weight of
0.2% for revenues accruing in 200 years, and for the consumers, with a discount factor of 5hp.a., a
weight of around 35% for the utility after 200 years, and around 20% after 300 years obtains.
22The model does not explicitly account for technological progress.
















































































































Figure 5: Dynamics without liquefaction, cd =10000Gt
















































































































Figure 6: Dynamics without liquefaction, cd =1000Gt
26Fig. 7 shows the dynamics for a baseline scenario in which liquefaction is possible with
an overhead cost of cl = 15$/bbl.



































































































































Figure 7: Dynamics with liquefaction, cl =15$/bbl
The dynamics in Fig. 7 is more complex than in the two previous ￿gures. After approxi-
mately 80 years, liquefaction becomes economical and takes o￿. The price curves explain
this point in time: with coal being sold at approximately 90$/t and the overhead cost
of 15$/bbl,23 the production costs for synthetic fuel are approximately 60$/bbl. This
corresponds to the oil market price indicated at the time when liquefaction begins. From
that point forward, the extraction rate of genuine oil drops rapidly to a low level, while
the overall extraction rate of coal increases rapidly to a level much higher than during
the ￿rst 80 years: considerable amounts of coal are used for the production of synthetic
liquid fuel to replace most of the genuine oil. Accordingly, oil extraction costs and prices
increase slowly after the ￿rst 80 years, while coal costs and coal market prices start to
increase more rapidly after 80 years than initially. Synthetic fuel never replaces genuine
oil completely because the (still slowly) increasing coal extraction costs (resp. sales price
on the market) imply that in each period a speci￿c (small) additional amount of genuine
oil reserves become cost competitive against synthetic liquid fuel.
While Figs. 5 and 7 show the dynamics for the standard model setting with constant fuel
demand, Figs. 8 and 9 depict the fuel consumption dynamics for a path of increasing fuel
demand calibrated approximately according to IEA projections, and for a lower discount
23Recall that a ton of coal yields 2 barrels of synthetic oil.
27rate of resource owners, res = 5h instead of the standard res = 3%. In these ￿gures, the
fuel consumption paths are consistent with current observations: the current oil consump-
tion is very close to the real consumption of 31Gbbl/yr for oil and 5Gt/yr for coal (IEA,
2010), especially in the case without liquefaction. While it may not seem intuitive that
the typical fossil fuel owners are very patient and discount their future net revenues only
at a rate of 0.5%p.a., one reason why the model yields realistic current fuel consumption
results when assuming such a low pro￿t discount rate could be the fact that in reality,
notably for oil extraction the marginal extraction costs are typically increasing not only
in the cumulative extractions but also in the rate of extraction, as more capital is needed
and physical constraints increase the energy needed to extract the fuel at a higher rate,
and geological factors often imply risks of a perturbation of the fuel reservoir if the oil is
pumped too rapidly. Extraction costs that increase in the rate of extraction can have a
similar e￿ect of postponing parts of the fuel extractions as lower discount rates have. In
the case of the assumed path of growing fuel demand, liquefaction starts in approximately
50 years. Interestingly, this compares well to the starting time for liquefaction suggested
by the model results in Felder and Rutherford (1993), where liquefaction started mainly
around 2050. Similarly, the dynamic general equilibrium model developed by Chen et al.
(2011) suggests that around this time liquefaction replaces more and more crude oil.















































































































Figure 8: Dynamics without liquefaction, growing demand and res = 5h
For brevity, we do here not provide the regional split of the fuel consumptions. Cor-
responding plots are found in the next subsection, for the tax e￿ects. Notably in the































































































































Figure 9: Dynamics with liquefaction, cl =10$/bbl, growing demand and
res = 5h
scenario with growing demand, the initial fuel consumption in both parts of the world
corresponds to actual values (well within the 10%-range) and the regional fuel consump-
tion growth rates in the two regions correspond closely to those from the IEA projections
(see the growing demand part of the sensitivity analysis for a description of the IEA
growth path).
Finally, Fig. 10 presents the situation when oil is supplied monopolistically instead of
competitively. Because the monopolistic supplier takes into account the e￿ect of additional
sales on the price he achieves for each of the sold units, he leaves some units of the
oil in the ground even if they could be extracted for costs below the oil sales price ￿
because their price-depressing e￿ect would make the sales of all other units sold during
the same period less pro￿table, the monopolist leaves these additional reserves in the
ground. This explains why the extraction costs and the market price of oil do not fully
converge anymore in Fig. 10. Else the graph is qualitatively similar to the grpahs from the
standard scenario without liquefaction, besides that the oil consumption is now smaller
initially but decreases more slowly over time. This is also due to the larger resource
rent of the monopolist: in the early phases where the monopolist sells relatively large
amounts of oil, he sells less than competitive suppliers would overall, because further
sales of him in the initial periods would decrease the price of the many other units of oil
he simulataneously sells. With other words, the monopolis tends to smoothen the resource
sales over time. Interestingly, Fig. 10 shows that in the monopolistic case the calculated
initial oil consumption, 24.4Gbbl/yr, is just below the actual worldwide oil consumption
29of 30.7Gbbl/yr (IEA, 2010, Table 3.1), while under perfect competition the calculated
initial consumption was, with 50.4Gbbl/yr (Fig. 5), too large. This is comforting, as for
the most realistic case, an oligopolistic fuel supply, the predicted sales would be expected
to lie between the values for monopolistic and competitive supply, that is, if modeled they
could correspond to the real consumption data. The monopolist’s case is further discussed
in the sensitivity analysis on monopolistic oil supply.

























































































































Figure 10: Dynamics without liquefaction, monopolistic oil supply
Tax E￿ects. Figs. 11 and 12 show the e￿ect of a 40$/tCO 2 tax imposed solely on
emissions from oil (Fig.11), resp. solely on the emissions from coal (Fig. 12), for a scenario
without liquefaction. For the oil tax, a major fraction of the oil saved domestically in the
OECD region leaks to the ROW, where it is consumed notably in future periods. This
is di￿erent in the case of the tax on coal emissions. Fig. 12 shows that almost the full
amount of emissions regionally saved translates into global emission savings, as leakage
is negligible in this case. The observation of the shift of current oil consumption to the
future in the case of the oil tax may be interesting when we think about potential empirical
estimates of near-term leakage and static leakage rates. Such estimates may caputre only
the part of the induced emission increase in the ROW that occur in the ￿rst few years,
which constitutes a minor fraction of the overall leakage of the unilateral oil tax. This
underlines the skepticism about estimates of leakage rates in static models.
Figs. 13 and 14 depict the same situations as Figs. 11 and 12, but with liquefaction
becoming an economical alternative as soon as the price di￿erential between oil and coal

























































































































Figure 11: Dynamic impact of oil-only OECD emission tax, scenario without
liquefaction
Oil tax rate 40$/tCO2.

























































































































Figure 12: Dynamic impact of coal-only OECD emission tax, scenario without
liquefaction
Coal tax rate 40$/tCO2.
31extractions is large enough. In this case liquefaction also prevents leakage of the oil-only
emissions tax (Fig. 13), with respect to the absolute volume of liquid fuel consumption:
consuming less oil regionally primarily implies that liquefaction starts somewhat later,
but it does not have a strong in￿uence on the global energy prices, as the scarcity value
of the oil is limited to values that are below the point at which coal liquefaction becomes
interesting. Therefore, leakage in terms of end-consumption volumes is in this case limited
also for a tax on oil emissions.































































































































Figure 13: Dynamic impact of oil-only OECD emission tax, scenario with
liquefaction
Oil tax rate 40$/tCO2, cl = 15$/bbl.
Figs. 11 through 14 con￿rm that leakage from an oil tax appears to be much more impor-
tant than leakage from a coal tax. Thus, it is interesting to examine the e￿ects of an oil
tax more closely. Fig. 15 respectively shows the dynamic impact of a temporary (plots
a and c) and a permanent (plots b and d) OECD oil-emission tax (40$/tCO 2) on the
oil-consumption emissions occurring in the OECD and in the ROW and on the emissions
from synthetic oil provisions in the scenarios with liquefaction. For the sake of brevity,
the e￿ect of the oil tax on coal end-consumption is not considered at this point because,
due to the large abundance of coal, the coal market channel has here a comparatively
smaller impact on leakage.
Plots a and b in Fig. 15 show how, in the longer term, domestic oil savings from a tempo-
rary or a permanent, unilateral oil-emissions tax is compensated by consumption increases
in the ROW, resp. in later periods, in a business-as-usual scenario without liquefaction.































































































































Figure 14: Dynamic impact of coal-only OECD emission tax, scenario with
liquefaction
Coal tax rate 40$/tCO2, cl = 15$/bbl.
For this 200-year simulation, the oil-to-oil leakage rate is 91% for the temporary tax
(where even increased domestic consumption in later years contributes to the compen-
sation of initial savings) and 68% for the permanent tax. Even if future emissions are
present-discounted at an annual rate of 5h, these values remain above 50%. In a sce-
nario with liquefaction (plots c and d in Fig. 15), the temporary or permanent tax-induced
domestic oil consumption reductions only minimally a￿ect the longer-run price of oil, due
to the abundance of the synthetic substitute. Thus, there exists only a small e￿ect on
foreign or future overall liquid fuel consumption. 24 The domestic oil consumption reduc-
tion primarily changes the amount of synthetic fuel that must be produced worldwide,
and because of the missing end-consumption leakage, this change occurs almost on a one-
per-one ratio. Because synthetic oil is, overall, approximately twice as emission-intensive
as oil when considering end-consumption emissions, the oil-to-oil leakage rates are, in this
situation, negative with values of up to almost -100%: each unit of oil-emissions domesti-
cally spared reduces worldwide medium-term, oil-associated 25 emissions by approximately
two units. In this scenario with future liqufaction, undiscounted (discounted) oil-to-oil
leakage rates are, thus, for the temporary resp. the permanent tax, -68% (-45%) and
-113% (-98%).
24The limited e￿ect that exists is mainly concentrated in the pre-liquefaction periods, where the de-
pletion of oil has a non-negligible e￿ect on the oil price.
25Meant is genuine plus synthetic oil.
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(a) Initial Tax, no liquefaction
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(c) Initial Tax, with liquefaction
























(d) Permanent Tax, with liquefaction
Figure 15: Dynamics of oil-emission leakage from OECD oil-emission tax
Tax of 40$/tCO2 on oil consumption emissions in OECD, during the ￿rst 40 years (‘initial tax’)
resp. for 200 years (‘permanent tax’). Green indicates OECD oil-consumption emission changes,
red ROW oil-consumption emission changes, black changes in emissions from external SynOil
production (liquefaction). Values in brackets are present discounted sums ( = 5h). Resulting
undiscounted (discounted) oil-only leakage rates are (a) 0.91 (0.61), (b) 0.68 (0.54), (c) -0.68
(-0.45), (d) -1.13 (-0.98). These rates ignore the e￿ecte on coal end-consumption, which are
smaller (see Table 1 for overall leakage rates).
34To simplify the discussion, the previous paragraph and Fig. 15 focused only on oil-to-oil
leakage, that is, we considered the oil tax and only its e￿ects on oil-related emissions.
Due to the substitute character of the fuels, a tax on one fuel also has a direct in￿uence
on the consumption of the other fuel. In the following, we focus on the general leakage
e￿ect of permanent taxes.
We write Emissr and OilEmissr for the integral (over the entire simulation period) of
the oil tax induced change in emissions ￿ the total, resp. those from oil end-consumption
￿ in region r. The leakage rate of the reduced emissions from the tax on oil, while ignoring





This expression does not consider the e￿ect of the domestic oil tax on the domestic coal
consumption. This choice expresses the thought that the domestic coal emissions can be
subject to a domestic tax as well, making those emissions of secondary importance from
a domestic welfare perspective.
Alternatively, if the emissions are discounted with the annual discount factor e < 1,
denoting Emissr;t, resp. OilEmissr;t the total resp. the oil-only emissions change in









where t and  t are the beginning and the end of the considered period.
Numerical values for Eqs. 12 and 13 (and their counterparts for the tax on coal), consid-
ering the next 200 years, are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Leakage Rates from unilateral OECD taxes
Leakage Rate of Unilateral Tax of 40$/tCO 2 on OECD




Oil Tax Coal Tax Oil Tax Coal Tax
No Discounting 0.50 0.01 -1.09 0.22
Discounting
cons = 5h
0.40 0.01 -0.93 0.19
Recalling the concept of the GTF and the optimal regional tax, related to the leakage of
domestic emission savings activities, the rates indicated in Table 1 may already raise some
35expectations about the pattern of the optimal regional tax rates in the modeled two-region
situation with oil and coal: leakage rates of approximately 50% in the case of the oil-tax
in a scenario without liquefaction (column 2 in Table 1) suggest that the optimal oil tax
may be on the order of 50% of the region’s WTP for global emission reductions. In the
absence of relevant leakage from the coal tax in the same case where liquefaction is ruled
out (column 3 in Table 1), the optimal tax on coal is, in this case, close to the WTP. For
the case where lique￿ed coal provides an emission-intensive substitute for standard oil in
the future, the leakage rates of approximately -1 (column 4 in Table 1) imply that the
optimal tax on oil be on the order of two times the genuine WTP. Finally, the coal tax
is subject to a slightly larger interregional leakage e￿ect in the case with, compared to
the case without, liquefaction (column 5 vs. column 4 in Table 1), suggesting a somewhat
lower optimal regional coal tax if liquefaction becomes an option in the future. The
following section examines the optimal regional tax rates. These rates do, qualitatively
and quantitatively, correspond to the leakage pattern found here. The values do not,
however, precisely correspond to what one would estimate based on the observed leakage
rates and the GTF concept. This may be explained by two facts. First, in the non-linear
simulation model, the leakage rates depend on the level of the tax rates in general, so at
any potentially optimal tax rate, the leakage rates do not need to mach those indicated
in Table 1 for the taxes of 40$/tCO 2. Second, the e￿ects of the taxes on the two fuels
interact with each other in a non-linear way as well, thus potentially in￿uencing leakage
rates when both taxes are applied simultaneously, as is done in the following sub-sections.
First, however, let us examine with the numerical model, the case for our claim that there
is close to 100% leakage in the long-run in the absence of discounting and of major future
climate relevant developments.
Full Leakage without Discounting and Future Developments. The simulations
above generally exhibited limited leakage rates. Reasons that limited them were the
present discounting of future emissions, the limited time-horizon (of secondary importance
for the scenarios with discounting of emissions but relevant for the case of undiscounted
emissions), and the presence of technological changes, that is, coal liquefaction which
provided a dirty substitute for oil in the future, leading even to negative leakage rates
for the oil tax. But these are not the primary reasons why most leakage studies ￿nd
limited leakage rates: they typically do not discount future emissions, and most do not
explicitly assume that future political or technological developments would, e.g., prevent
emissions from occuring after a speci￿c time period. Instead, even those studies which
employ dynamic models with endogenous fuel depletion seem to restrict their attention
typically to the next few decades and it must be assumed that the leakage estimates would
increase if calculated in their way ￿ i.e. without discounting and political or technological
developments ￿ but with longer simulation horizons. To underline this point, in this
36subsection we consider the case of various emission discount rates, notably that of zero
discounting, and look at the resulting (very) long-run leakage rates. The hypothesis is
that in the case without discounting, the overall leakage rate converges towards 100%, or
￿in the case where fuel demand exhibits a somewhat lower choke price 26 in the ROW than
in the OECD prior to the tax ￿ to a somewhat lower but in any case very large leakage
rate.
We use a slightly adapted version of the model. To reduce the time horizon that must be
considered, we introduce a (clean and perfect) backstop that is available as a substitute for
coal at the price of 180 $/t. The primary e￿ect of this is to reduce both regions’ maximal
WTP for coal from a value that otherwise is beyond 200 $/t. Besides the desired e￿ect of
limiting the time horizon which has to be considered, this has also the e￿ect of neutralizing
the di￿erence between the two regions’ choke prices for coal. 27
The time horizon during which the leakage rates grow before eventually reaching their
￿nal values depends strongly on the amount of coal overall extractable, that is, the speed
with which the coal extractions costs increase as reserves deplete, and on whether the
current fuel demand remains constant or whether it continues to grow also in the future.
In order to account for both possibilities, of slow and of rapid fuel exhaustion, we ￿rst
look at the situation how it could be if the coal extraction costs rise rapidly and the
fuel demand continues to grow over time (case 1), and as a second step examine how the
situation could look like if most of the existing coal resources are extractable for rather
modest costs (the standard coal extraction cost scenario) and fuel demand is constant over
time (case 2). In the two scenarios, the time it takes for the leakage rates (of undiscounted
or discounted emissions) to converge to their ￿nal values di￿ers strongly, with around 150
years in case 1, compared to several thousand years for case 2 (see Figs. 16 and 17).
Fig. 16 shows, for the case 1-parameterization, that is, with a demand growing at an
annual rate of 2% and the coal extraction costs doubling after each 1000Gt, the leakage
rate of a uniform unilateral OECD climate tax of 40$/tCO 2 as as a function of the
model time-horizon of up to 250 years. While if only the ￿rst few years are considered,
the overall leakage rate is with less than 10% low independent of the discount rate, the
leakage rate grows steadily with the widening of the model horizon to take on values
26The price for which the fuel demand just becomes zero, corresponding thus in a sense to the WTP
for the ‘last drop of oil’ (or coal).
27In the original model, the two calibrated demand systems exhibit somewhat di￿erent coal choke prices.
More than re￿ecting a real di￿erence in the two regions’ economies, this di￿erence is to be considered
as an artefact of a calibration of the demand system to current fuel prices and consumption levels and
chosen (cross-)price elasticities. Notably if the ROW countinues to catch up with the developed cuntries,
there exists in reality no obvious reason why there should exist a major di￿erence in the long-run choke
price for a fuel between the two regions. As one would expect given that in the original model the choke
price in the OECD is somewhat larger than in the ROW, a long-horizon model run without the clean
coal-backstop resulted in a long-run leakage rate of somewhat less than 1, 70%, much larger than the
bulk of the estimates in the leakage literature.

































Figure 16: Undiscounted and discounted leakages for case 1
Uniform OECD CO2 tax of 40$/t, for growing demand (growth rate 2%) and low coal availability
(cd =1000Gt).
of around 20% if the coming 50 years are considered and around 40% for 100 years
considered, with the interest rate playing a relevant role only if more than 50 years are
considered. Interestingly, the found leakage rates during these 50 to 100 years compare
fairly well to values from traditional leakage studies. As the ￿gure shows, however, the
leakage rates grow considerably larger if a longer future is considered, converging ￿ in
already around 150 years ￿ to 100% for the undiscounted emissions and slightly more
than 50% even for emissions discounted at 2%p.a.

































Figure 17: Undiscounted and discounted leakages for case 2
Uniform OECD CO2 tax of 40$/t, for static demand and abundant coal (cd =10000Gt).
Fig. 17 indicates the leakage pattern for the second case where coal availability corresponds
to the standard case considered in the model. Simulations were run for 6000 years and
the curves show how the leakage rates depend on the number of years (the ‘time horizon’)
whose emissions are taken into account. That is, considering, for example, the emissions
projected to occur in the next 3000 years, the leakage rate for undiscounted emissions
(blue curve) would be around 40%.28
28Here simulations were run for 6000 years and the leakage rates calculated using the emissions that
38The long time it takes for the leakage rates to converge in case 2 are in stark contrast to
the relatively rapid convergence in case 1. This emphasizes on one hand the importance
of projections of economic (or at least fuel-demand) growth rates and on the other hand
shows the important role of an accurate representation of the supply of the (endogenously)
depleting fossil fuels. As a second di￿erence to Fig. 16, Fig. 17 shows that here even very
low discount rates su￿ce to reduce overall long-run leakage rates to very modest values,
of less than 30% even for a discount rate as low as 1h. This is no surprise, given the
very long time it takes for most leakage to occur in case 2.
Interestingly, the model results in Fig. 17 indicate a non-monotonicity of the leakage rates
as a function of the number of years for which the (undiscounted or weakly discounted)
emissions are considered: the undiscounted overall leakage rate rises to 15% for the ￿rst
600 years’ emissions, to decrease by about one percent if instead the ￿rst 900 years are
considered, before steadily rising towards the ￿nal leakage rate of 100% if emissions dur-
ing several millennia are taken into account. The simple reason for this non-monotonicity
is that an important fraction of oil, which is available primarily during the ￿rst few cen-
turies, leakes relatively rapidly, but the very abundant coal is subject to low leakage rates
during the ￿rst centuries. The large leakage rate of oil in the ￿rst few centuries drives
up the overall leakage rate during these years, but with the extension of the considered
time-horizon coal starts do dominate the overall tax-induced emission changes, leading
accordingly to a lower overall leakage rate that only for even longer time-horizons rises
again and ultimately converges to the larger values in the course of several millennia. Fig.
21 in Appendix C, which shows the time path of OECD and ROW emission changes sep-
arately from oil and from coal consumption changes induced by the OECD tax, con￿rms
this interpretation.
For a tax that is, instead of permanent, only applied during the ￿rst 50 years, the emission
convergence is somewhat faster 29 but the overall leakage pattern resembles to that found
with the permanent taxes (Fig. 22 in Appendix C).
Optimal Climate Taxes. The numeric models were used to determine the optimal
OECD climate taxes for the standard situations with and without liquefaction. In addition
to the climate tax, the optimal regional tax theoretically contains an import tari￿ not
directly related to climate change: even in the absence of any pollution externality, a
relevant fossil fuel importing country has an incentive to tax these fuels to extract parts
occur from today up to a certain number of years in the future. While this may provide a more realistic
picture of the timing of expected tax-induced changes of future emissions in the future, a second possibility
would be to look at the predicted overall leakage rates estimated with model runs simulating only a limited
number of future years, which would correspond more closely to typical studies in the literature. Fig. 23
in the Appendix C shows that the di￿erences between the results from the two methods are very small.
29Naturally, the total amount of economically extractable fuels is used up earlier if the tax reduces
consumption in one region only during a short instead of permanently.
39of the fossil fuel scarcity rent. These optimal import tari￿s can be substantial. This
is notably the case if a region imports all the fuels it consumes, as is assumed in the
standard scenarios in this study (see the sensitivity analysis in the next subsection for a
relaxation of this assumption). Following, for example, Golombek et al. (1995), we use
the concept of the optimal (pure) climate tax de￿ned as the optimal regional tax on the
fuels given a speci￿c WTP for global emission reductions, minus the optimal regional tax
on the fuels if there is no externality (i.e., with the WTP for climate protection as zero). 30
The subtracted import tari￿ components are not assumed to be imposed, notably as they
could enter into con￿ict with WTO rules. 31 Appendix D shows the levels of the optimal
import tari￿s for the standard model parameterizations.
Table 2 presents the optimal climate taxes for a WTP of the OECD for global emission
reductions of 40$/tCO2. Considering the insights from the previous paragraph, it is no






All values in $/tCO2, for a WTP of 40$/tCO2 for global emission reductions.
surprise that, in the case without future liquefaction, the optimal carbon price on emissions
from oil is much lower than the genuine WTP for global emission reductions: 20.4$/tCO 2
on oil emissions versus a WTP of 40$/tCO 2 for global emission reductions. In the absence
of future liquefaction, a large fraction of domestic oil-consumption savings falls victim to
the fuel leakage mechanism; a large fraction of the domestic oil savings is compensated by
an increased non-OECD oil consumption primarily in the future (Fig. 18). Accordingly,
the optimal regional carbon tax on oil emissions amounts only to approximately half of the
WTP for emission reductions. For coal, which is only minimally a￿ected by leakage (due to
its abundance, which prevents large price changes from OECD consumption reductions),
the optimal climate tax on emissions has a level of 38.7$/tCO 2. In other words, it almost
equates to the assumed WTP for global emission reductions of 40$/tCO 2.
30B￿hringer et al. (2010) introduce a technique that considers the compensation of the no-policy region
by the taxing region, in order to estimate the pure climate tax component.
31The incentive for individual OECD countries to impose such import tari￿s on the fuels may in any
case be very small: the optimal import tari￿s are large for the whole OECD acting as one country, because
a reduction in their fuel demand will have a signi￿cant impact on the worldwide fuel market, reducing
the sales price of the fuel owners. Any individual OECD member-country does, however, hardly have any
substantial incentive to impose any fuel taxes in addition to the agreed-upon climate taxes: an individual
country’s demand has only a limited impact on global fuel prices. Thus, the country itself would primarily
distort prices for its own economy - the main bene￿ciaries being the remaining oil-consuming countries
which can buy at least slightly cheaper fuels on the worldwide markets.
40The most interesting case is the case where liquefaction allows for the transformation of the
abundant coal into a synthetic liquid fuel, thereby substituting oil in the end-consumption.
In this case, the optimal regional tax on oil is, at 70.7$/tCO 2, nearly twice as great as
the genuine regional WTP for global emission reductions (40$/tCO 2). This stems from
the fact that synthetic oil from liquefaction is, overall, twice as emission-intensive as
standard oil. Furthermore, because of the ‘backstop’ represented by coal liquefaction, the
long-run oil price varies less with regional oil consumption, implying that only a limited
interregional leakage of end-consumption of liquids takes place. Turning to the coal tax,
due to the assumed large coal reserves, although an important amount of it is used in
the future for the liquefaction process, coal remains abundant enough for the leakage
rate from domestic coal savings to remain low. This ultimately implies that the optimal
regional tax on coal, 36.6$/tCO 2, still closely corresponds to the region’s WTP for global
emission reductions. Figs. 18 and 19 show the dynamics for the cases without and with
liquefaction.
We primarily focus on regionally optimal constant tax rates. It is important to understand
that the optimal ￿exible paths of taxes over time seem not to deviate strongly from a
constant tax. Especially, there is no reason for a notable di￿erence of the optimal tax on
oil immediately prior to and after the onset of liquefaction. Even before liquefaction has
started, if OECD consumes one unit less of standard oil, the overall ‘marginal’ unit of
oil that is prevented from being burned is primarily a unit of lique￿ed oil as the initially
saved unit of standard oil primarily implies that standard oil lasts slightly longer before
coal liquefaction begins to replace genuine oil. In other words, the major fraction of the
unit of crude oil spared initially will later be consumed anyway, and the marginal unit of
oil spared worldwide in the medium run is a unit of synthetic oil from liquefaction with
the high emission intensity that goes along with it. Therewith, the optimal tax on oil
is initially already large, similarly to the later periods after liquefaction has commenced.
The sensitivity section below con￿rms the stability of the optimal tax level over time.
7.4 Model Extensions and Sensitivity Analysis
The exact optimal regional taxes on the fuel emissions depend on the assumptions in
the model. To understand how the results change under di￿erent assumptions, twelve
speci￿c types of extensions and alternative parameterizations have been examined. As
the following results show, the key ￿ndings outlined above are found to be rather robust
with respect to these model assumptions.
Longer Simulation Horizon. Doubling the length of the simulation horizon to 400
years from the 200 years in the standard scenario, barely changes the qualitative results.

























































































































Figure 18: Dynamic impact of an optimal OECD fuel-emission tax, scenario
without liquefaction
Tax of 20.4$/tCO2 on oil and 38.7$/tCO2 on coal.































































































































Figure 19: Dynamic impact of an optimal fuel-emission tax, scenario with
liquefaction
Tax of 70.7$/tCO2 on oil and 36.6$/tCO2 on coal.
42The main results, reported in Table 3, show that in the case without liquefaction, the
optimal OECD tax on emissions from oil consumption is now below 50% of the region’s
WTP for emission reductions, at 18.0$/tCO 2. This is because, over the longer run, the
total amount of oil consumed is limited even more by the physical resource stocks rather
than by the amount demanded from it. With respect to coal emissions, the optimal
climate tax remains slightly below the WTP, at 38.3$/tCO 2. For the case where lique-
faction will, in the future, allow the production of synthetic liquid fuel from coal, the
extension of the simulation period from 200 to 400 years has an even lower impact on the
optimal tax rates. For oil emissions, it is now 70.1$/tCO 2, and for coal emissions, it is
34.7$/tCO2. The slight drop in the optimal regional coal tax in both scenarios with the
extended simulation horizon, stems from the fact that in the very long run, coal is also
a scarce resource, implying that current regional consumption reductions tend to create
some leakage to future periods instead of representing true genuine worldwide eternal fuel
savings. The e￿ect is, however, still very small due to (i) the abundance of coal even
in terms of centuries’ consumption, and (ii) the exponential discounting of future emis-
sions, which, over several centuries, becomes relevant despite the limited discount rate of
cons = 5hp.a.










Alternative Cross-Price Elasticities. Table 4 shows the results for the case when
cross-price elasticities of half, resp. double of the standard cross-price elasticities are as-
sumed. Most optimal tax values are only slightly a￿ected. Some are changed to a relevant
extent, but qualitatively the results remain similar and the changes go into the expected
direction: given lower cross-price elasticities of the fuel demand, the optimal tax on oil,
if there is no liquefaction, becomes 17.5$/tCO 2, i.e., lower than in the standard case and
even lower than half of the WTP. This was expected because the lower cross-price elas-
ticity means that regional reductions in oil consumption and the induced reduction of the
world market price imply a lower reduction of the coal consumption in the other region,
thus overall leading to an even lower global impact (in terms of worldwide carbon emis-
sions) of the regional oil consumption reductions. Analogously, the inverse is observed for
the scenario with the larger cross-price elasticities, where the optimal tax on emissions
43from oil combustion rises to 26.3$/tCO 2.














Oil 17.5 70 26.3 72.5
Coal 38.7 36.5 38.8 37
WTP 40
Resources Belonging to OECD and ROW rather than to External Entities.
In the standard model, fuel owners are external to the two economic regions whose fuel
demand is modeled. This may be defensible, for example, for oil, where a large fraction
of the reserves are concentrated in a few countries with relatively small populations that
are responsible only for a minor fraction of global CO 2 emissions.
The assumption of an import of 100% of the consumed fuels also drives the substantial
optimal trade-taxes found in the simulations (see the detailed results in Appendix D).
However, primarily for coal, important fractions of worldwide reserves are situated within
OECD countries. Therefore, the reserve distribution between the two modeled regions
is here accounted for. As an approximation based on BGR and IEA data, 13% of the
worldwide oil resources and 43% of the coal resources are assumed to be situated in the
OECD region,32 implying that these fractions of the resource rents are attributed to the
OECD.
Note that liquefaction-emissions are still assumed to occur outside of the OECD region.
This is the logical consequence of the absence of stringent border tax adjustments and free
trade in fossil fuels, as well as emissions taxes strictly imposed on domestically occurring
emissions. Theoretically, even OECD-coal may be exported for the liquefaction processes
in regions not taxing the large amount of CO 2 emissions generated during the liquefaction
process. However, because close to 60% of all coal reserves are situated in non-OECD
territory, such an export may, even in the longer run, not be necessary as most synthetic
fuel would, in any case, be produced in the non-OECD regions and OECD coal-export
restrictions or duties would not signi￿cantly change the picture of the global emissions.
Table 5 indicates the optimal environmental taxes for this case. Comparing the values
with those of the standard case where all resources are assumed to be imported (Table 2),
32Sources: BGR (2009), Table A 3-4, and IEA (2011), Table II.4.
44shows that the values remain almost entirely unchanged (all values change by less than
2%). While representing comforting evidence for the adequacy of the here used concept
for the disentangling of trade and climate components of the regionally optimal overall
tax, these results are not surprising: the distribution of the freely traded resources has
much less to do with the optimal environmental tax, than with the optimal trade tax on
these fuels. The details on the optimal regional trade tax on the fuels are reported in
Appendix E. They show a signi￿cant decrease in the import tax on oil and a decrease
of the very low import tax on coal. This makes sense because the import tax allows a
region that imports a scarce good to extract parts of the good-owner’s scarcity rent as
it depresses the equilibrium price on the world market. As the share of the good that
a country or a region owns increases, that region pro￿ts less from market-price-lowering
import tari￿s because of its already higher own share of the resource rent. See Appendix E
for a further discussion of this optimal trade-tax pattern based on results from additional
simulations.










Monopolistic Oil Supply. In the standard scenarios all fuels are assumed to be
supplied competitively. If one considers the overall large number of fossil fuel suppliers
around the world, and notably the limited means OPEC seems to have to enforce compli-
ance of its member states to respect their respective quotas, this may not be a completely
implausible assumption. However, an oligopolistic structure would probably be a more
realistic representation of the market than perfect competition. To consider the e￿ect that
the market supply structure could have on the optimal regional climate taxes, we here
consider the case of a monopolistic supply, which is the opposite extreme of perfect com-
petition and should thus allow to approximate the maximal e￿ect the ‘imperfectness’ of
the fuel supply competition may have on the market outcome, beyond even any oligopoly
with a limited number of competitors.
For the case without liquefaction, the model was thus extended to allow for monopolistic
oil supply.33 Table 6 indicates the optimal taxes in the case where oil is supplied mo-
33It would be more comlicated to extend the case with liquefaction to monopolistic fuel supply, because,
45nopolistically. The numbers indicate that the optimal taxes are almost the same as in
the competitive case: while the coal tax is una￿ected, the optimal oil tax is only slightly
increased in the monopolistic case, by less than 3%, from the standard value of 20.4 to
21.1$/tCO2. Fig. 10 shows the fuel consumption and price dynamics under monopolistic
oil supply.









Alternative (Emission) Discount Rates of Consumers. As is intuitive and as Figs.
16 and 17 suggest, the discount rate by which the future emissions are present-discounted
can have a substantial impact on the calculated leakage rate and therefore on the optimal
regional fuel-emission taxes. Table 7 indicates the optimal taxes if the consumers (resp.
the policy maker) do not apply any discounting at all, resp. if they us a discount rate
of 2%, instead of the 0.5% in the standard case. While the optimal coal tax is barely
in￿uenced by the discount rate, the oil tax changes in the directions that one may have
anticipated: in the absence of the discount rate, the optimal OECD oil taxes become
more extreme than in the standard case, while with the large discount rate, the oil taxes
are closer to the genuine WTP for climate protection, with the oil tax in the case with
liquefaction remaining only slightly above the genuine WTP of 40$/CO 2.
Faster Coal Depletion. Table 8 provides results for the case where coal reserves de-
plete more rapidly with declining reserves, assuming cp =2000GtCO2. In the case with-
out liquefaction, this changes the optimal unilateral climate tax on oil only slightly, to
slightly below 20$/tCO2, but primarily lowers the optimal coal tax, to 33.7$/tCO 2. The
lower optimal tax on coal suggests that the increased scarcity of coal implies that even
regional coal consumption reductions now have a signi￿cant impact on the international
e.g., the oil owner could not easily calculate, for each period, the e￿ect of a variation of its supply on the
amount of coal supplied in the current and other periods. While in the case without liquefaction it is,
due to the low substitutability between the two fuels, most likely unproblematic that the monopolistic
supplier does not take into account his e￿ect on the supply of the other fuel, taking into account the
e￿ect of oil supply on the supply of synthetic fuel would be central for the monopolist in the case where
liquefaction is allowed.














Oil 17.0 78.5 21.5 46.3
Coal 38.0 34.7 38.3 36.9
WTP 40
coal prices, leading to an increased coal consumption in ROW, that is, to a signi￿cant
leakage rate. This is further accentuated in the case with liquefaction, which requires
a substantial amount of additional coal. In this case, because coal is now subject to
a relevant interregional leakage e￿ect, and the future synthetic substitute for oil is also
coal-derived, both fuels are now subject to lower optimal unilateral emission taxes than
in the case with standard coal depletion. With approximately 50$/tCO 2, the optimal tax
on oil remains, however, signi￿cantly larger than the region’s WTP for global emission
reductions, and it remains almost exactly twice as high as the optimal tax on coal at
26.6$/tCO2.









Lower Discount Rate of Resource-Owners. Notably Middle Eastern countries have
large oil reserves that are exploitable for very low costs. As the oil price plots in Figs.
5 through 7 suggest, if the fuel owners were to act rationally as assumed in the present
model and exhibited a discount rate of res = 3%, the oil owners would be expected to o￿er
their oil more cheaply under current market conditions than what is actually observed on
global oil markets (even though only a few years ago the di￿erence would have been much
smaller). To account for this apparent di￿erences, we run the model with a lower discount
rate for the fuel owners, of res = 5h, corresponding also to the policy maker’s discount
47rate cons in the standard scenario. While besides a low discount rate there exist various
other physical and economic factors that potentially explain why the current resource
rent for oil producers is so high despite relatively large reserves of cheap resources, a
rate of res = 5h results indeed in a modeled resource path with initial consumption
rates and prices close to actual observations. Tested for the case without liquefaction,
regional consumption values of both fuels are in a 15%-range around observed regional
consumption in 2008/2009 (for more details on a case with a lower discount rate, see Figs.
8 and 9, where also a growing demand was used in accordance with IEA estimates, further
improving the match between the model and reality). Table 9 gives the optimal OECD
climate taxes found for the case with res = 5h. The tax rates di￿er only slightly from
the optimal taxes in the standard case; all key ￿ndings are preserved. This is especially
encouraging as it seems not trivial to model the behavior of the various actors on the
supply side of the fuel market in a very precise way. The fact that a large change in the
fuel owners’ discount rate seems not to have any major impact on the optimal fuel taxes
in the cases examined here, suggest that even if some details of the fuel supply market
are not represented in a model, the calculated e￿ect of climate policies may still be closer
to reality than one may assume on ￿rst sight.










Growing Demand. The standard model assumes the demand system to be constant
over time. In reality, fuel demand is projected to grow over the next few decades notably in
the emerging economies of the ROW. To take this into consideration, an extended model
version that allows for a time-varying demand system is employed. Based on projections of
the IEA World Energy Outlook 2009 for their reference scenario (IEA, 2009), we consider
a scenario where fuel demand is constant in the OECD and growing at 2.6%p.a. in the
ROW during the ￿rst 25 years. In the long run we assume that, as the ROW economies
are maturing, their energy demand growth rates slowly decline over time after the ￿rst
25 years, by 0.05%p.a., until the time the economies reach a state where autonomous
energy e￿ciency improvements set o￿ any ￿nal demand increases; from then on the energy
48demand growth rate is 0.34 This scenario still leads to the same central conclusions of a
low tax on oil emissions if there is no liquefaction in the future and a high oil emission
tax if the future is marked by liquefaction. Quantitatively, the growing demand does have
a signi￿cant impact on the optimal regional OECD tax rates on emissions from the two
fuels (Table 10). All four considered optimal climate tax rates are lower than in the case
without demand growth. In the case without liquefaction, the optimal climate tax on
oil is decreased to approximately one-third of the WTP for global emission reductions.
Similarly, the optimal climate tax on coal decreases almost to 30$/tCO 2 in the case with
liquefaction. These observations can be explained by the larger leakage rates. That is,
due to the growing demand, oil becomes even more scarce over time, leading to a larger
overall oil leakage rate, particularly in the case without liquefaction. Finally, especially
if liquefaction is possible, the growing demand causes even coal to become a truly scarce
resource, implying that, in this scenario, even a lowering of regional coal consumption has
a relevant impact on global coal prices, thus leading through this channel to signi￿cant
leakage rates.
While Table 10 indicates the optimal regional climate taxes for the above described de-
mand paths and the standard discount rate of fuel owners, in the case of the same in-
creasing demands but a lower resource-owner discount rate of res = 5h ￿ this is the
situation whose dynamics is plotted in Figs. 8 and 9 ￿, the optimal OECD oil resp. coal
climate taxes are (in $/tCO 2) 13.1 resp. 35.3 in the case without liquefaction and 62.5
resp. 29.6 with liquefaction. If all demands grow at a rate of 1%p.a. throughout the
entire simulation period, they are, in the same order, 13.5 resp. 36 (without liquefaction)
and 63.6 resp. 28.9 (with liquefaction), assuming standard discount rates.
34In the World Energy Outlook 2009 reference scenario lasting through 2030, oil consumption is assumed
to decline by 0.3%p.a. between 2008 and 2030 in the OECD, while it increases by 2.3%p.a. in the
ROW (IEA, 2009, p.81, Table 1.3). Correcting these consumption changes for the average annual oil
consumption changes during the same period in our standard model with constant demand (these changes
are -0.3%p.a. in the OECD and -0.2%p.a. in the ROW) to approximate demand changes, we ￿nd a
constant oil demand in the OECD, and an increase in the ROW of 2.5%p.a.
In the same World Energy Outlook scenario, coal consumption declines by 0.2%p.a. between 2007
and 2030 in the OECD and increases by 2.8%p.a. in the ROW (IEA, 2009, p.90, Table 1.5). Correcting
these consumption changes for the average annual coal consumption changes during the same period in
our standard model with constant demand (these changes are +0.2%p.a. in the OECD and -0%p.a. in
the ROW) to approximate demand changes, we ￿nd coal demand in the OECD changing by -0.4%p.a.,
and increasing by approximately 2.8% in the ROW.
Thus, in each region, average demand growth rates are very close to each other accross the fuels during
the period from 2007/2008 through 2030 and we approximate them by assuming a constant demand for
both fuels in the OECD and an annual growth of 2.6% for both fuels in the ROW. Note that for the
coal demand in the OECD, the di￿erence between our assumption (0%) and what the World Energy
Outlook data implies (0.4%) is in the medium-run smaller than what the here cited numbers suggest on
￿rst sight: OECD consumption is in the World Energy Outlook assumed to slightly decrease only until
2015, from then on the projected consumption change is already approximately zero until 2030.










Increased Carbon Intensity of Unconventional Oil. Unconventional fuels are sup-
posed to have 23% higher well-to-wheel emissions than conventional oil (Brandt, 2011).
Here, an extended version of the model assumes that the emission intensity of oil increases
linearly in the amount of oil already extracted, such that after the 2500Gbbl of remaining
conventional oil are consumed, the overall emission intensity of oil is 23% higher than
initially.35
Table 11 shows the main results for this scenario: as one would expect, the optimal
regional tax on the ￿nal-combustion-emissions of oil are here somewhat higher than in
the standard scenario with the constant emission intensity, primarily in the case where
crude oil is not replaced by lique￿ed coal in the near future.
Table 11: Optimal OECD climate taxes when the oil well-to-wheel emission









Di￿erent Overhead Costs of Liquefaction Process. In the standard parameteri-
zations, the overhead cost of the liquefaction process is assumed to be 15$ per barrel of
synthetic oil produced. As shown in Fig. 7, in this case liquefaction starts after almost 100
years. Table 12 reports the optimal regional tax rates for the cases where (i) liquefaction
352500Gbbl is the approximate value of remaining conventional oil according to IEA (2010). In line
with the general model assumptions in the standard parameterization, the oil is here supposed to be
extracted by some external producers. As the excess-emissions thus occur during the external production
process and not primarily during end-use combustion, they are not taxed, but they are taken into account
by the OECD as part of the global emissions.
50requires no overhead costs, cl = 0, resp. where (ii) liquefaction requires large overhead
costs of 70$/bbl.












The values in Table 12 show how the change in the overhead costs of liquefaction imply
a gradual shift of the optimal regional tax rates: for high liquefaction overhead costs,
i.e., when liquefaction occurs only late (column 3 in Table 12) the tax rates approach
those without any liquefaction. For low overhead costs, i.e., when liquefaction occurs
earlier (column 2 in Table 12), the ratio of the optimal OECD tax rates on the two fuels
approaches that of the ratio of the emission intensity of oil from lique￿ed coal and that
of standard oil.
Accounting for the Possibility of an Exogenous Clean Backstop. The possibil-
ity that technical advancements provide alternative energy sources that may replace the
fossil fuels as major primary energy sources cannot be excluded. As Habermacher and
Kirchg￿ssner (2011) have shown, this can reverse the e￿ects of climate policy measures
that one would ￿nd if excluding that possibility. There does not exist, however, any con-
sensus on a speci￿c value for the probability of such a drastic technological development,
and the timing when such a development may materialize, or more precisely, the stochastic
joint distribution of various potential future developments, is unclear as well. In addition,
so called backstop technologies may, in reality, not be perfect. 36 For example, they may
be available only in limited quantities (of energy delivered), or their development may
occur so gradually that the price path of the conventional energy sources can be crucial
for the time and speed of introduction of the backstop technologies. It is beyond the
scope of this study to consider these aspects in detail. Instead, the simple concept of a
perfect backstop is considered whose introduction is stochastic with an exogenous annual
probability of introduction. In this case, it can be intuitively understood, and it has been
shown by Dasgupta and Heal (1974), that the behavior of all forward-looking agents, such
as the tax-setting institution of the OECD and the suppliers, can be modeled in the same
36As a perfect backstop we consider an emission-free energy source, abundant enough in terms of
amount and cost for it to fully replace its competing fossil fuels from the time on it is introduced.
51way as in the case without any possible backstop while augmenting their discount rates
by the annual probability of the introduction of the backstop. Table 13 provides results
for the cases of an annual probability (ap) of the introduction of a backstop of 1% and
2%.





Probability for Alternative Developments (annual probability ap)






Oil 26.3 55.7 30.6 46.6
Coal 39.1 38.0 39.3 38.7
WTP 40
ap=1% implies that the cumulative probability of an alternative development
to make fossil fuels redundant is 18% after 20 years, and 40% after 50 years.
ap=2% implies that the cumulative probability of an alternative development
to make fossil fuels redundant is 33% after 20 years, and 64% after 50 years.
Table 13 shows that the possibility of future switches to backstop technologies do not
reverse the main ￿ndings with respect to the optimal regional emission tax structure The
optimal OECD tax on coal emissions remains close to the region’s WTP for global emission
reductions in all four cases. The optimal tax on emissions from oil remains substantially
below the WTP in the case where liquefaction is impossible and substantially above the
WTP in the case where liquefaction substitutes crude oil in the medium-term future, even
if all four values for the optimal oil-emission tax are now closer to the WTP than in the
standard case where a backstop was implicitly ruled out for the next 200 years.
Optimal Early versus Future Tax Levels. In reality, the optimal committed regional
fuel emission taxes may describe non-constant time-paths rather than constant values, as
assumed in this study. Here, the aim is to verify how close the found optimal-constant
values for constant taxes may be to the truly optimal ￿exible tax paths. For this purpose,
the extent to which a deviation from the optimal constant taxes found above would be
optimal during the ￿rst 40 years is analyzed. Table 14 shows the main results.
For the situation without any liquefaction, the optimal initial environmental tax shows
only an insigni￿cant deviation from the optimal constant tax rate, suggesting that the
optimal tax path may be close to constant over all the periods. This may have been
expected, as parts of any unit of fuel spared regionally during any speci￿c period may
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Oil 22.0 55.1 61.0 61.4
Coal 36.8 36.8 36.3 35.7
leak in parts to any other periods, independent of the exact time when the regional fuel
saving may have occurred.
The situation for the case with liquefaction di￿ers to a certain extent. The optimal oil
emission tax rates in the initial periods are still substantially above the WTP for global
emission reductions, but they are lower than for the later periods, resp. lower than the
optimal constant tax would be. As an example, the results in column 3 of Table 14
show for the standard scenario with liquefaction ( cl =15$/bbl) that while the optimal
constant oil-tax rate would be approximately 70$/tCO 2, the optimal value during the
initial periods is lower, at 55$/tCO 2. If liquefaction starts earlier (column 4 in Table 14,
cl =0$/bbl) or if the discount rate cons for future emissions is low (column 5, 2h instead
of 5h), the optimal climate tax on oil remains, however, larger also in the initial periods:
the optimal initial tax, in these cases, continues to remain at 61$/tCO 2.
Fig.20 shows how the fuel consumption and emission paths respond to a change in the
initial oil-tax rate in the standard scenario with liquefaction and explains the optimal
initial tax rates. An increase of the OECD tax on oil-emissions during the initial periods
(until year 40), leads to a substantial direct reduction of the region’s oil consumption
during that period in the standard scenario with liquefaction (corresponding to column
3 in Table 14). Thus, 21.5GtCO2 are saved (depression of the green curve on the left-
hand side plots in Fig.20). Because of the (dirty) ‘backstop’, that is, the liquefaction
of abundant coal, the initial reduction of domestic oil consumption has only a minimal
impact on the future fuel prices, limiting the leakage in terms of end-consumption of fuels.
It has, however, a strong impact on the amount of synthetic oil (SynOil) produced through
liquefaction in the future. Notably, due to the low leakage in terms of oil consumption, the
initial oil savings imply that oil will last longer and ultimately translate to an almost one-
53per-one reduction in the amount of oil demand that is to be met through coal liquefaction
during the time when SynOil begins to replace crude oil. This leads to 19.2Gt of CO 2
saved because crude oil lasts longer (the depression of the black curve on the left-hand
side plots in Fig.20). This is the mechanism through which current oil-savings imply,
over the coming centuries, even higher than one-per-one emission savings if liquefaction
of abundant coal becomes a relevant process for meeting sustained demand for liquid
fuels. The optimal unilateral initial tax rate of 55.1$/tCO 2 on emissions from oil use in
the OECD corresponds primarily to the combined present discounted e￿ect of the noted
initial emission savings and those savings during the time when liquefaction begins. The
initial tax applies to the 21.5Gt of CO 2 saved initially, but it also induces an additional
reduction of emissions of 19.2Gt of CO 2, which occurs approximately 110 years later.
Given the discount rate of 5h, the latter are discounted by a factor of approximately
0:995110 = 0:576. Taking this discounting into account when reusing the concept of the
GTF from Chapter 3, a rough approximation of the optimal initial tax rate is given by


ini  0 |{z}
WTP

21:5Gt + 0:576  19:2Gt
21:5Gt | {z }
GTF
 60:6$=tCO2:
Considering the rawness of this approximation, and given that the leakage in the pre-
liquefaction periods, which is not entirely negligible (see green and red curves in the
left plots in Fig.20), would lead to some reduction of the optimal initial tax, this value
compares reasonably well to the numerically found value of 55.1$/tCO 2 in the simulation.
In conclusion, the evidence gathered in this section suggests that the optimal tax rates
may, in many cases, be fairly constant over time, notably in the case where no backstop
(in the form of the liquefaction process) for the scarce crude oil is available in the future.
Even if liquefaction dramatically increases the intensity of the liquid fuel production
process in the future, this higher future emission intensity is already strongly re￿ected
in the optimal initial unilateral tax rates on oil. Thus, in all considered situations with
future liquefaction, the optimal initial tax rate on genuine oil is much larger than the
WTP for global emission reductions, which is explained due to the negative leakage of
saved oil, this is, because oil saved during the initial periods reduces the production of
SynOil in the future. In this scenario where liquefaction plays a role in the future, the
(i) lower the production costs of liquefaction and the (ii) lower the discount rate used to
present-discount future emissions, the greater are the optimal initial tax rates on oil, as
can intuitively be understood.
In the present modeling, we do not assume subgame-perfectness of the OECD tax path
choices. Instead, the policy maker in the OECD is supposed to commit for the entire
simulation period to the initially set tax plan, which can, however, foresee a di￿erent tax
during the initial time-period than for the remainder of the simulated time horizon.
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Figure 20: Impact of the change of the oil-tax rate for the initial 40 years
from the optimal initial value to the optimal constant-value
558 Discussion
Partial and general equilibrium analyses analytically demonstrate the need for fuel- de-
pendent emission pricing, and the results of a numerical model suggest that the fuel-
di￿erentiation of the optimal carbon price on emissions is substantial for the case of an
OECD-wide climate tax scheme. Some additional words regarding the intuition behind
the claim that optimal regional carbon accounting is fuel-dependent may be in order.
Thus, reconsider the examples from the partial-equilibrium analysis in section 4. If a
fuel is globally supplied in a ￿xed, price-independent amount and if demands for di￿er-
ent fuels are independent, the optimal regional climate tax on that fuel may be zero, as
regional consumption reductions are fully compensated by fuel consumption increases in
the remainder of the world. This seems intuitive: there is no reason to speci￿cally care
about the emissions from a speci￿c consumption if in the world, an exact, exogenous ￿xed
amount of that speci￿c consumption takes place anyway, that is, if your own action does
not have any e￿ect on the relevant amount of global emissions. In reality, no fuel supply
is completely inelastic in the medium-term, but we stress that the optimal regional tax
gradually changes with supply elasticity. Additionally, the fact that real consumptions
of di￿erent fuels are not fully independent does not alter our ￿ndings qualitatively. As
long as the fuels are not perfect substitutes for all uses, some requirement to di￿erentiate
among fuels for the e￿cient CO2 tax remains. To see this, one may consider the example
of a wizard who transforms an irrelevant piece of land into a deposit of a speci￿c type of
fuel with the amount being de￿ned as the equivalent of a certain amount of CO 2. This
transformation will have repercussions on global fuel use and emissions. The associated
increase in global emissions may strongly depend notably upon the type and quality of
fuel in the additional deposit. For example, peat, coal, oil or wood may be ‘extractable’
at highly speci￿c per-unit costs. Additionally, the fuels are of speci￿c scarcities as speci￿c
regional and global extraction possibilities and demands exist for each of them. Thus,
most would probably agree that the implications that the additional reserve from the
wizard’s transformation will have on short-, medium-, and long-term emissions depend on
the type of fuel the wizard created. 37 Finally, reducing domestic emissions by taxing do-
mestic fuel consumption has, in a ￿rst approximation, the same e￿ect as (i) an equivalent
reduction in regional emissions plus (ii) an increase of available fuels (corresponding to
the domestic savings) in the remainder of the world. Thus, the wizard’s example does, to
37As a further aspect supporting this point of view, one may also note the importance the various types
of available fossil fuels have on the discussions on climate change and mitigation strategies. If scholars,
policy makers or society in general would really consider the types of the fuels stored underground of
secondary importance (which, in general, can be considered a necessary condition for the question, which
fuels we save through a unilateral climate policy, to be irrelevant), they should collapse the discussions
about how much of which fuel is available into a single amount of overall carbon contained in all the fuels
together. The fact that they do not do so in general is an indirect support for the non-negligible di￿erence
it makes for the climate, which carbon source a region prevents from being domestically consumed.
56a certain extend, correspond to the domestic fuel-saving policy. In reality, the additional
fuels are not created by a wizard but by the domestic fuel savings, yet they cause a similar
additional fuel ‘deposit’ to be available in the remainder of the world, with the e￿ects on
the current and later (leakage) emissions depending on the type of fuel.
The dynamic analysis in section 7 has several important implications. It explains why,
notably for oil, the relevant leakage rates may be much larger than most previous studies
suggested, but, depending on the future developments, that leakage may also be very
strongly negative instead of positive (i.e., emissions in the remainder of the world may
be reduced, adding to the domestic reduction). It also has the uncomfortable implication
that any attempt for a sensible assessment of the leakage e￿ects will not only require
considerable information about the current fuel market conditions but also signi￿cant
information about the prospects for technical developments (e.g., the development of fuel
transformation processes, alternative energy sources, technologies that may change our
lifestyle and, therfore, the fuel demand pattern) or political developments (e.g., global
climate treaties) concerning greenhouse gas emissions. Equally problematic is that any
sensible leakage index will strongly depend on the controversial time-discounting of future
greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, explicitly making and stating such assumptions along
with any proposed leakage rate seems to be the only viable option. Nothing is gained
from neglecting uncertainties and by implicitly assuming these away, e.g., by relying on
a dubious concept of a static fuel supply or considering only contemporaneous leakage
during the next few years despite the long-term character of the climate problem. If,
with an important but controversial probability, massive liquefaction will occur in the
future and if, in this case, domestic oil savings would ￿ as the present analysis suggests
￿ be subject to a negative leakage rate of approximately -75%, and if, without that
liquefaction, domestic oil savings would be subject to a large positive leakage rate of
approximatively 50% ￿ as also suggested in our model ￿ then economic models should
take both possibilities into account, despite the uncertainties attached, rather than solely
focusing on a business-as-usual baseline and implicitly attributing a 100% probability to
its materialization. Finally, the scepticism expressed in this article against the traditional
leakage literature may be rephrased as follows: many will agree that one can not be
sure whether a major fraction of the realistically exploitably fossil fuels will in the long
run be left underground or whether practically all of these fuels will be consumed by
future generations. In the latter case, it seems clear that regional emission savings during
the next few decades are ultimately subject to a leakage of close to 100% in terms of
undiscounted emissions. The surveyed studies hardly provide any substantive economic
reasons why this scenario should be impossible. Yet, they suggest deterministic, modest
leakage rates. As far as sensible economic depletion models for the fossil fuels are used,
those rates will, notably, depend on the time-horizon of the model simulations. It may in
some cases indeed make some sense to assume limited rather than quasi-in￿nite horizons,
57as one may attach a value even to know that emissions be at least delayed for a couple of
decades, a preference that may also be funded in the belief that technological or political
progress hopefully prevents the emissions from a certain point in time on anyway. The
judgement on the value of such a delay strongly depends on personal perceptions and
beliefs about the future. A corresponding leakage rate should therefore be proposed
together with explicit statements about the assumptions under which it is obtained. If
this was broadly acknowledged, gradual discounting of emissions rather than a simple and
somewhat arbitrary cuto￿ of the simulation time-horizon would surely be preferred.
The numerical analysis in the present study is based on a relatively simple fuel demand ￿
or fuel utility ￿ system with parameter values calibrated to ￿t current fuel consumption
and prices, and some (cross-)price elasticity values inspired by the literature. Although
the sensitivity analysis has shown the key ￿ndings to be robust to changes in a variety of
parameters and assumptions, it would be interesting to further examine the core issues of
this paper ￿ the time dimension of carbon leakage from a market-based regional climate
policy and the fuel-dependent structure of the optimal regional policy ￿ in an analysis
within a multisectoral framework. An adequate representation of the fuel substitutabilities
(in speci￿c applications) and fuel transformation processes, such as coal-to-liquids, would
be crucial for accurate modeling (see, e.g., Lanz and Rausch, 2011, who show that the
inclusion of bottom-up elements is necessary for a general equilibrium model to accurately
represent the electricity sector and its emissions). Thus, complementing a multisectoral
top-down model with bottom-up elements concerning the substitutability of fossil fuels
in the major fuel-consumption domains could be an interesting point for future research
on the topic addressed here (see, e.g., Chen et al., 2011, for a dynamic model in which
a top-down approach is coupled with a bottom-up representation of coal liquefaction
processes).
Some words on the practical implementability of a fuel-dependent carbon pricing scheme
may be in order. Contrary to how it may initially appear, an adaptation of the regional
carbon tax scheme in the proposed direction would not make the ￿nal implementation
of a climate policy more complicated. Even today, carbon emissions are not measured
directly ‘at the stacks’. Instead, the systems track the amounts of di￿erent fuels used
and multiply these values by some fuel-speci￿c emission factors, according to the carbon
content of the fuels. Once agreed on estimates of applicable GTF factors, the hitherto
used emission factors would simply have to be multiplied by the GTF factors and then
used as new accountable emission factors, while the remainder of the accounting system
could be left wholly unchanged. Thus, the fuel-speci￿city of a climate policy would barely
complicate the system, and a policy re￿nement, as proposed herein, may be sensible even
in times when the simplicity of a climate agreement is crucial for its implementability and
even when carefully designed income tax systems are challenged by more simple ￿at tax
58alternatives.
Finally, that leakage e￿ects would imply that fuels not consumed in climate-protecting
regions would be consumed elsewhere in the world is one of the strongest political argu-
ments against a stringent unilateral climate policy. Thus, properly accounting for such
leakage e￿ects in the dimension of fuel-speci￿c carbon accounting may not only imply an
e￿ciency gain but also increase the political acceptance of unilateral action.
9 Conclusion
Optimally, regional climate protection schemes would weight emissions according to the
fuel type from which they are generated. Using uniform CO 2 pricing or allowing only
production-sector di￿erentiation, rather than fuel-speci￿c pricing, implies economic excess
costs, which may be substantial.
Due to interregional leakage, the optimal tax on a speci￿c fuel is generally positively
related to the price elasticity of the global supply of that fuel. This conclusion also holds
for fuel-speci￿c emission accounting in cap-and-trade systems where the rules for optimal
prices in a tax scheme can be adopted to weight emissions for the quantity-based policies.
Because fuel supply and demand are complexly intertwined with other activities in all
major economic sectors, the estimation of optimal fuel-speci￿c weights on emissions for a
regionally de￿ned policy is complicated and may best be addressed by numerical dynamic
general equilibrium models featuring a detailed description of regional supplies of the ma-
jor currently consumed fuels. Our analysis, based on a dynamic model considering the
exhaustibility of oil and coal and calibrated fuel demand systems for OECD and for the
rest of the world, suggests that in a business-as-usual scenario without liquefaction, oil
savings in the OECD are subject to a leakage rate of 50%. Thus the optimal tax should
equate to half of the domestic WTP for global emission reductions, while coal emission
savings do barely leak and coal emissions should, therefore, be taxed at a value close to the
WTP for global emission reductions. In the case where liquefaction will, in the future,
substitute the depleted crude oil, this pattern is reversed: oil consumption reductions
imply that, sooner or later, a lower amount of emission-intensive synthetic oil must be
produced, implying a negative leakage rate of up to 75%, that is, an optimal regional tax
on oil emissions close to twice the domestic WTP for global emission reductions. While
an extensive sensitivity analysis showed these ￿ndings to be relatively robust to a number
of key assumptions in the applied model, an increase of the worldwide fuel demand over
time could increase the leakage and lead to even lower optimal regional taxes relative to
the WTP for emission reductions. The possibility of future technological developments,
such as alternative technologies (clean backstops) and potentially future stringent global
59political agreements, could lower the leakage rates. The fact that the leakage rates depend
so strongly on future developments casts doubt on the numerous semi-empirical estimates
provided in the literature without any explicitly stated assumptions about future tech-
nical or political developments on the fossil fuel markets; the concept of static leakage
rates, and of undiscounted leakage throughout a speci￿c and limited time-period, must
be reconsidered.
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64Appendix
(A) Calculations for Analytical General Equilibrium Model































































































































l from Eq. 4,
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i = 0, this


































(B) Details for the Numerical Model
Current Prices and Regional Consumption of Fuels for Calibration.
See Table 15.
Table 15: Current fuel consumption and prices
Sources: IEA (2010) and World Bank (2011)
(C) Details of Emission Leakage from Uniform OECD-tax
See Figs. 21 through 23.















































































































Figure 21: Dynamics of regional oil- and coal-emission changes from OECD
tax
Regional emission changes resulting form a permanent uniform CO 2 tax of 40$/t in the OECD.






























Figure 22: Undiscounted and discounted leakages for initial tax
Uniform OECD CO2 tax of 40$/t during ￿rst 50 years, for static demand.

































Figure 23: Limited simulation horizons vs. accounting emissions for di￿erent
time-horizons
Uniform OECD CO2 tax of 40$/t. Overall leakages estimated with limited model simulation
horizons (plain curves) and leakages for emissions occuring up to a limited time (from today on)
calculated from long model simulations (dashed curves).
67(D) Optimal Terms-of-Trade Import Tari￿s for Coalition of all
OECD-Countries in Standard Model
See Table 16.
Table 16: Optimal OECD trade and climate taxes on the imported fuels











Optimal Climate Tax ( = 2 - 1) Oil 20.4 70.7
Coal 38.7 36.6
(E) Optimal Terms-of-Trade Import Tari￿s for Coalition of all
OECD-Countries if they own Parts of the Resources
Taking into account that the OECD-coalition owns 13% of worldwide oil reserves, and 43%
of the coal reserves, reduces the optimal import taxes signi￿cantly, in the case without
liquefaction from 65.7$/tCO 2 for oil and 0.67$/tCO2 for coal (Table 16) in the case
with external fuel owners to 57.6$/tCO 2 and 0.33$/tCO2 (Table 18) if the fuel stocks are
distributed according to today’s situation. This was expected, because if OECD receives a
share of the resource rent, it is less important to arti￿cially reduce its fuel demand in order
to lower the market price of the globally traded fuels. Interestingly, the relative reduction
of the optimal import taxes corresponds quite precisely to the fraction of the fuels situated
in the OECD (65:7  (1   13%) = 57:1, i.e. close to 57.6, and 0:67  (1   43%) = 0:38,
i.e. close to 0.33).
Column 2 in Table 18 shows what happens if OECD were a net exporter of the fuels,
which could be expected if it owned 60% of the worldwide fuel stocks. Interestingly,
the optimal regional trade tax (the import tari￿) is still positive, notably for oil. The
remaining columns in the table con￿rm that this is related to the alleged shortsightedness
of the resource owners: as the resource owners discount their future revenues by a rate of
3% while the consumer’s discount rate is 5h, the planner chooses to impose a positive
tax on the fuel consumption in order for the fuels not to be thrown on the market too
rapidly. For the same fuel shares of 60%, but with patient resource owners that discount
their future real revenues by the same 5h as the society discounts its future utility ￿ows,
the optimal border tax on the fuels becomes indeed a positive export duty (column 3 in
68Table 17: Optimal OECD taxes with regionally distributed resource stocks













Optimal Climate Tax ( = 2 - 1) Oil 20.4 72.0
Coal 38.8 36.9
Table 18). With this duty the hypothetically fuel exporting OECD could raise the market
price for fuels, increasing the scarcity rent from its sales. Finally, the results in column
4 in Table 18 show that the optimal oil trade tari￿ turns again into an import tax if
OECD’s share in the fuel stocks were assumed to be 40%, even if resource owners were
still assumed to be as patient as the remainder of the society. Given that the demand
from OECD corresponds to almost 50% of the worldwide demand this is what one would
have expected. For coal the optimal tax is still slightly negative, which is sensible as the
OECD’s share of the worldwide coal consumption is only 34%, i.e., OECD would still be
an exporter of coal, suggesting a positive export duty on that fuel.
Table 18: Optimal OECD climate taxes with hypothetical regional resource
stock distributions and hypothetical discounting

















(res = cons =
5hp.a.)
Oil 26.7 -10.3 21.5
Coal 0.1 -0.6 -0.1
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